In security-restricted operations, block enqueue of at-commit user code.
authorNoah Misch <noah@leadboat.com>
Mon, 9 Nov 2020 15:32:09 +0000 (07:32 -0800)
committerNoah Misch <noah@leadboat.com>
Mon, 9 Nov 2020 15:32:09 +0000 (07:32 -0800)
commit0c3185e963d9f9dd0608214f7d732b84aa0888fe
treee12049825b26d0190b69ae3dad84391a11542f79
parent8f113698b63b15a4e0a4b15d3ee37238c1d1821d
In security-restricted operations, block enqueue of at-commit user code.

Specifically, this blocks DECLARE ... WITH HOLD and firing of deferred
triggers within index expressions and materialized view queries.  An
attacker having permission to create non-temp objects in at least one
schema could execute arbitrary SQL functions under the identity of the
bootstrap superuser.  One can work around the vulnerability by disabling
autovacuum and not manually running ANALYZE, CLUSTER, REINDEX, CREATE
INDEX, VACUUM FULL, or REFRESH MATERIALIZED VIEW.  (Don't restore from
pg_dump, since it runs some of those commands.)  Plain VACUUM (without
FULL) is safe, and all commands are fine when a trusted user owns the
target object.  Performance may degrade quickly under this workaround,
however.  Back-patch to 9.5 (all supported versions).

Reviewed by Robert Haas.  Reported by Etienne Stalmans.

Security: CVE-2020-25695
contrib/postgres_fdw/connection.c
src/backend/access/transam/xact.c
src/backend/commands/portalcmds.c
src/backend/commands/trigger.c
src/test/regress/expected/privileges.out
src/test/regress/sql/privileges.sql