*
*
* IDENTIFICATION
- * $Header: /cvsroot/pgsql/src/backend/libpq/be-secure.c,v 1.1 2002/06/14 04:23:17 momjian Exp $
- *
+ * $Header: /cvsroot/pgsql/src/backend/libpq/be-secure.c,v 1.2 2002/06/14 04:31:49 momjian Exp $
+ *
+ * Since the server static private key ($DataDir/server.key)
+ * will normally be stored unencrypted so that the database
+ * backend can restart automatically, it is important that
+ * we select an algorithm that continues to provide confidentiality
+ * even if the attacker has the server's private key. Empheral
+ * DH (EDH) keys provide this, and in fact provide Perfect Forward
+ * Secrecy (PFS) except for situations where the session can
+ * be hijacked during a periodic handshake/renegotiation.
+ * Even that backdoor can be closed if client certificates
+ * are used (since the imposter will be unable to successfully
+ * complete renegotiation).
+ *
+ * N.B., the static private key should still be protected to
+ * the largest extent possible, to minimize the risk of
+ * impersonations.
+ *
+ * Another benefit of EDH is that it allows the backend and
+ * clients to use DSA keys. DSA keys can only provide digital
+ * signatures, not encryption, and are often acceptable in
+ * jurisdictions where RSA keys are unacceptable.
+ *
+ * The downside to EDH is that it makes it impossible to
+ * use ssldump(1) if there's a problem establishing an SSL
+ * session. In this case you'll need to temporarily disable
+ * EDH by commenting out the callback.
+ *
* PATCH LEVEL
* milestone 1: fix basic coding errors
* [*] existing SSL code pulled out of existing files.
*
* milestone 3: improve confidentially, support perfect forward secrecy
* [ ] use 'random' file, read from '/dev/urandom?'
- * [ ] emphermal DH keys, default values
+ * [*] emphermal DH keys, default values
* [ ] periodic renegotiation
+ * [ ] private key permissions
*
* milestone 4: provide endpoint authentication (client)
* [ ] server verifies client certificates
#ifdef USE_SSL
#include <openssl/ssl.h>
#include <openssl/e_os.h>
+#include <openssl/dh.h>
#endif
extern void ExitPostmaster(int);
ssize_t secure_write(Port *, const void *ptr, size_t len);
#ifdef USE_SSL
+static DH *load_dh_file(int keylength);
+static DH *load_dh_buffer(const char *, size_t);
+static DH *tmp_dh_cb(SSL *s, int is_export, int keylength);
static int initialize_SSL(void);
static void destroy_SSL(void);
static int open_server_SSL(Port *);
static SSL_CTX *SSL_context = NULL;
#endif
+/* ------------------------------------------------------------ */
+/* Hardcoded values */
+/* ------------------------------------------------------------ */
+
+/*
+ * Hardcoded DH parameters, used in empheral DH keying.
+ * As discussed above, EDH protects the confidentiality of
+ * sessions even if the static private key is compromised,
+ * so we are *highly* motivated to ensure that we can use
+ * EDH even if the DBA... or an attacker... deletes the
+ * $DataDir/dh*.pem files.
+ *
+ * We could refuse SSL connections unless a good DH parameter
+ * file exists, but some clients may quietly renegotiate an
+ * unsecured connection without fully informing the user.
+ * Very uncool.
+ *
+ * Alternately, the backend could attempt to load these files
+ * on startup if SSL is enabled - and refuse to start if any
+ * do not exist - but this would tend to piss off DBAs.
+ *
+ * If you want to create your own hardcoded DH parameters
+ * for fun and profit, review "Assigned Number for SKIP
+ * Protocols" (http://www.skip-vpn.org/spec/numbers.html)
+ * for suggestions.
+ */
+static const char file_dh512[] =
+"-----BEGIN DH PARAMETERS-----\n\
+MEYCQQD1Kv884bEpQBgRjXyEpwpy1obEAxnIByl6ypUM2Zafq9AKUJsCRtMIPWak\n\
+XUGfnHy9iUsiGSa6q6Jew1XpKgVfAgEC\n\
+-----END DH PARAMETERS-----\n";
+
+static const char file_dh1024[] =
+"-----BEGIN DH PARAMETERS-----\n\
+MIGHAoGBAPSI/VhOSdvNILSd5JEHNmszbDgNRR0PfIizHHxbLY7288kjwEPwpVsY\n\
+jY67VYy4XTjTNP18F1dDox0YbN4zISy1Kv884bEpQBgRjXyEpwpy1obEAxnIByl6\n\
+ypUM2Zafq9AKUJsCRtMIPWakXUGfnHy9iUsiGSa6q6Jew1XpL3jHAgEC\n\
+-----END DH PARAMETERS-----\n";
+
+static const char file_dh2048[] =
+"-----BEGIN DH PARAMETERS-----\n\
+MIIBCAKCAQEA9kJXtwh/CBdyorrWqULzBej5UxE5T7bxbrlLOCDaAadWoxTpj0BV\n\
+89AHxstDqZSt90xkhkn4DIO9ZekX1KHTUPj1WV/cdlJPPT2N286Z4VeSWc39uK50\n\
+T8X8dryDxUcwYc58yWb/Ffm7/ZFexwGq01uejaClcjrUGvC/RgBYK+X0iP1YTknb\n\
+zSC0neSRBzZrM2w4DUUdD3yIsxx8Wy2O9vPJI8BD8KVbGI2Ou1WMuF040zT9fBdX\n\
+Q6MdGGzeMyEstSr/POGxKUAYEY18hKcKctaGxAMZyAcpesqVDNmWn6vQClCbAkbT\n\
+CD1mpF1Bn5x8vYlLIhkmuquiXsNV6TILOwIBAg==\n\
+-----END DH PARAMETERS-----\n";
+
+static const char file_dh4096[] =
+"-----BEGIN DH PARAMETERS-----\n\
+MIICCAKCAgEA+hRyUsFN4VpJ1O8JLcCo/VWr19k3BCgJ4uk+d+KhehjdRqNDNyOQ\n\
+l/MOyQNQfWXPeGKmOmIig6Ev/nm6Nf9Z2B1h3R4hExf+zTiHnvVPeRBhjdQi81rt\n\
+Xeoh6TNrSBIKIHfUJWBh3va0TxxjQIs6IZOLeVNRLMqzeylWqMf49HsIXqbcokUS\n\
+Vt1BkvLdW48j8PPv5DsKRN3tloTxqDJGo9tKvj1Fuk74A+Xda1kNhB7KFlqMyN98\n\
+VETEJ6c7KpfOo30mnK30wqw3S8OtaIR/maYX72tGOno2ehFDkq3pnPtEbD2CScxc\n\
+alJC+EL7RPk5c/tgeTvCngvc1KZn92Y//EI7G9tPZtylj2b56sHtMftIoYJ9+ODM\n\
+sccD5Piz/rejE3Ome8EOOceUSCYAhXn8b3qvxVI1ddd1pED6FHRhFvLrZxFvBEM9\n\
+ERRMp5QqOaHJkM+Dxv8Cj6MqrCbfC4u+ZErxodzuusgDgvZiLF22uxMZbobFWyte\n\
+OvOzKGtwcTqO/1wV5gKkzu1ZVswVUQd5Gg8lJicwqRWyyNRczDDoG9jVDxmogKTH\n\
+AaqLulO7R8Ifa1SwF2DteSGVtgWEN8gDpN3RBmmPTDngyF2DHb5qmpnznwtFKdTL\n\
+KWbuHn491xNO25CQWMtem80uKw+pTnisBRF/454n1Jnhub144YRBoN8CAQI=\n\
+-----END DH PARAMETERS-----\n";
+
/* ------------------------------------------------------------ */
/* Procedures common to all secure sessions */
/* ------------------------------------------------------------ */
/* SSL specific code */
/* ------------------------------------------------------------ */
#ifdef USE_SSL
+/*
+ * Load precomputed DH parameters.
+ *
+ * To prevent "downgrade" attacks, we perform a number of checks
+ * to verify that the DBA-generated DH parameters file contains
+ * what we expect it to contain.
+ */
+static DH *
+load_dh_file (int keylength)
+{
+ FILE *fp;
+ char fnbuf[2048];
+ DH *dh = NULL;
+ int codes;
+
+ /* attempt to open file. It's not an error if it doesn't exist. */
+ snprintf(fnbuf, sizeof fnbuf, "%s/dh%d.pem", DataDir, keylength);
+ if ((fp = fopen(fnbuf, "r")) == NULL)
+ return NULL;
+
+/* flock(fileno(fp), LOCK_SH); */
+ dh = PEM_read_DHparams(fp, NULL, NULL, NULL);
+/* flock(fileno(fp), LOCK_UN); */
+ fclose(fp);
+
+ /* is the prime the correct size? */
+ if (dh != NULL && 8*DH_size(dh) < keylength)
+ {
+ elog(DEBUG, "DH errors (%s): %d bits expected, %d bits found",
+ fnbuf, keylength, 8*DH_size(dh));
+ dh = NULL;
+ }
+
+ /* make sure the DH parameters are usable */
+ if (dh != NULL)
+ {
+ if (DH_check(dh, &codes))
+ {
+ elog(DEBUG, "DH_check error (%s): %s", fnbuf, SSLerrmessage());
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ if (codes & DH_CHECK_P_NOT_PRIME)
+ {
+ elog(DEBUG, "DH error (%s): p is not prime", fnbuf);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ if ((codes & DH_NOT_SUITABLE_GENERATOR) &&
+ (codes & DH_CHECK_P_NOT_SAFE_PRIME))
+ {
+ elog(DEBUG,
+ "DH error (%s): neither suitable generator or safe prime",
+ fnbuf);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ }
+
+ return dh;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Load hardcoded DH parameters.
+ *
+ * To prevent problems if the DH parameters files don't even
+ * exist, we can load DH parameters hardcoded into this file.
+ */
+static DH *
+load_dh_buffer (const char *buffer, size_t len)
+{
+ BIO *bio;
+ DH *dh = NULL;
+
+ bio = BIO_new_mem_buf((char *) buffer, len);
+ if (bio == NULL)
+ return NULL;
+ dh = PEM_read_bio_DHparams(bio, NULL, NULL, NULL);
+ if (dh == NULL)
+ elog(DEBUG, "DH load buffer: %s", SSLerrmessage());
+ BIO_free(bio);
+
+ return dh;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Generate an empheral DH key. Because this can take a long
+ * time to compute, we can use precomputed parameters of the
+ * common key sizes.
+ *
+ * Since few sites will bother to precompute these parameter
+ * files, we also provide a fallback to the parameters provided
+ * by the OpenSSL project.
+ *
+ * These values can be static (once loaded or computed) since
+ * the OpenSSL library can efficiently generate random keys from
+ * the information provided.
+ */
+static DH *
+tmp_dh_cb (SSL *s, int is_export, int keylength)
+{
+ DH *r = NULL;
+ static DH *dh = NULL;
+ static DH *dh512 = NULL;
+ static DH *dh1024 = NULL;
+ static DH *dh2048 = NULL;
+ static DH *dh4096 = NULL;
+
+ switch (keylength)
+ {
+ case 512:
+ if (dh512 == NULL)
+ dh512 = load_dh_file(keylength);
+ if (dh512 == NULL)
+ dh512 = load_dh_buffer(file_dh512, sizeof file_dh512);
+ r = dh512;
+ break;
+
+ case 1024:
+ if (dh1024 == NULL)
+ dh1024 = load_dh_file(keylength);
+ if (dh1024 == NULL)
+ dh1024 = load_dh_buffer(file_dh1024, sizeof file_dh1024);
+ r = dh1024;
+ break;
+
+ case 2048:
+ if (dh2048 == NULL)
+ dh2048 = load_dh_file(keylength);
+ if (dh2048 == NULL)
+ dh2048 = load_dh_buffer(file_dh2048, sizeof file_dh2048);
+ r = dh2048;
+ break;
+
+ case 4096:
+ if (dh4096 == NULL)
+ dh4096 = load_dh_file(keylength);
+ if (dh4096 == NULL)
+ dh4096 = load_dh_buffer(file_dh4096, sizeof file_dh4096);
+ r = dh4096;
+ break;
+
+ default:
+ if (dh == NULL)
+ dh = load_dh_file(keylength);
+ r = dh;
+ }
+
+ /* this may take a long time, but it may be necessary... */
+ if (r == NULL || 8*DH_size(r) < keylength)
+ {
+ elog(DEBUG, "DH: generating parameters (%d bits)....", keylength);
+ r = DH_generate_parameters(keylength, DH_GENERATOR_2, NULL, NULL);
+ }
+
+ return r;
+}
+
/*
* Initialize global SSL context.
*/
}
}
+ /* set up empheral DH keys */
+ SSL_CTX_set_tmp_dh_callback(SSL_context, tmp_dh_cb);
+ SSL_CTX_set_options(SSL_context, SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE);
+
return 0;
}
*
*
* IDENTIFICATION
- * $Header: /cvsroot/pgsql/src/interfaces/libpq/fe-secure.c,v 1.1 2002/06/14 04:23:17 momjian Exp $
+ * $Header: /cvsroot/pgsql/src/interfaces/libpq/fe-secure.c,v 1.2 2002/06/14 04:31:49 momjian Exp $
*
* NOTES
* The client *requires* a valid server certificate. Since
* backend works (especially that pre-SSL negotiation) to identify
* a fix.
*
+ * ...
+ *
+ * Unlike the server's static private key, the client's
+ * static private key ($HOME/.postgresql/postgresql.key)
+ * should normally be stored encrypted. However we still
+ * support EPH since it's useful for other reasons.
+ *
* OS DEPENDENCIES
* The code currently assumes a POSIX password entry. How should
* Windows and Mac users be handled?
*
* milestone 3: improve confidentially, support perfect forward secrecy
* [ ] use 'random' file, read from '/dev/urandom?'
- * [ ] emphermal DH keys, default values
+ * [*] emphermal DH keys, default values
*
* milestone 4: provide endpoint authentication (client)
* [ ] server verifies client certificates
#ifdef USE_SSL
static int verify_cb(int ok, X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
static int verify_peer(PGconn *);
+static DH *load_dh_file(int keylength);
+static DH *load_dh_buffer(const char *, size_t);
+static DH *tmp_dh_cb(SSL *s, int is_export, int keylength);
static int initialize_SSL(PGconn *);
static void destroy_SSL(void);
static int open_client_SSL(PGconn *);
static SSL_CTX *SSL_context = NULL;
#endif
+/* ------------------------------------------------------------ */
+/* Hardcoded values */
+/* ------------------------------------------------------------ */
+
+/*
+ * Hardcoded DH parameters, used in empheral DH keying.
+ * As discussed above, EDH protects the confidentiality of
+ * sessions even if the static private key is compromised,
+ * so we are *highly* motivated to ensure that we can use
+ * EDH even if the user... or an attacker... deletes the
+ * $HOME/.postgresql/dh*.pem files.
+ *
+ * It's not critical that users have EPH keys, but it doesn't
+ * hurt and if it's missing someone will demand it, so....
+ */
+static const char file_dh512[] =
+"-----BEGIN DH PARAMETERS-----\n\
+MEYCQQD1Kv884bEpQBgRjXyEpwpy1obEAxnIByl6ypUM2Zafq9AKUJsCRtMIPWak\n\
+XUGfnHy9iUsiGSa6q6Jew1XpKgVfAgEC\n\
+-----END DH PARAMETERS-----\n";
+
+static const char file_dh1024[] =
+"-----BEGIN DH PARAMETERS-----\n\
+MIGHAoGBAPSI/VhOSdvNILSd5JEHNmszbDgNRR0PfIizHHxbLY7288kjwEPwpVsY\n\
+jY67VYy4XTjTNP18F1dDox0YbN4zISy1Kv884bEpQBgRjXyEpwpy1obEAxnIByl6\n\
+ypUM2Zafq9AKUJsCRtMIPWakXUGfnHy9iUsiGSa6q6Jew1XpL3jHAgEC\n\
+-----END DH PARAMETERS-----\n";
+
+static const char file_dh2048[] =
+"-----BEGIN DH PARAMETERS-----\n\
+MIIBCAKCAQEA9kJXtwh/CBdyorrWqULzBej5UxE5T7bxbrlLOCDaAadWoxTpj0BV\n\
+89AHxstDqZSt90xkhkn4DIO9ZekX1KHTUPj1WV/cdlJPPT2N286Z4VeSWc39uK50\n\
+T8X8dryDxUcwYc58yWb/Ffm7/ZFexwGq01uejaClcjrUGvC/RgBYK+X0iP1YTknb\n\
+zSC0neSRBzZrM2w4DUUdD3yIsxx8Wy2O9vPJI8BD8KVbGI2Ou1WMuF040zT9fBdX\n\
+Q6MdGGzeMyEstSr/POGxKUAYEY18hKcKctaGxAMZyAcpesqVDNmWn6vQClCbAkbT\n\
+CD1mpF1Bn5x8vYlLIhkmuquiXsNV6TILOwIBAg==\n\
+-----END DH PARAMETERS-----\n";
+
+static const char file_dh4096[] =
+"-----BEGIN DH PARAMETERS-----\n\
+MIICCAKCAgEA+hRyUsFN4VpJ1O8JLcCo/VWr19k3BCgJ4uk+d+KhehjdRqNDNyOQ\n\
+l/MOyQNQfWXPeGKmOmIig6Ev/nm6Nf9Z2B1h3R4hExf+zTiHnvVPeRBhjdQi81rt\n\
+Xeoh6TNrSBIKIHfUJWBh3va0TxxjQIs6IZOLeVNRLMqzeylWqMf49HsIXqbcokUS\n\
+Vt1BkvLdW48j8PPv5DsKRN3tloTxqDJGo9tKvj1Fuk74A+Xda1kNhB7KFlqMyN98\n\
+VETEJ6c7KpfOo30mnK30wqw3S8OtaIR/maYX72tGOno2ehFDkq3pnPtEbD2CScxc\n\
+alJC+EL7RPk5c/tgeTvCngvc1KZn92Y//EI7G9tPZtylj2b56sHtMftIoYJ9+ODM\n\
+sccD5Piz/rejE3Ome8EOOceUSCYAhXn8b3qvxVI1ddd1pED6FHRhFvLrZxFvBEM9\n\
+ERRMp5QqOaHJkM+Dxv8Cj6MqrCbfC4u+ZErxodzuusgDgvZiLF22uxMZbobFWyte\n\
+OvOzKGtwcTqO/1wV5gKkzu1ZVswVUQd5Gg8lJicwqRWyyNRczDDoG9jVDxmogKTH\n\
+AaqLulO7R8Ifa1SwF2DteSGVtgWEN8gDpN3RBmmPTDngyF2DHb5qmpnznwtFKdTL\n\
+KWbuHn491xNO25CQWMtem80uKw+pTnisBRF/454n1Jnhub144YRBoN8CAQI=\n\
+-----END DH PARAMETERS-----\n";
+
/* ------------------------------------------------------------ */
/* Procedures common to all secure sessions */
/* ------------------------------------------------------------ */
return -1;
}
+/*
+ * Load precomputed DH parameters.
+ *
+ * To prevent "downgrade" attacks, we perform a number of checks
+ * to verify that the DBA-generated DH parameters file contains
+ * what we expect it to contain.
+ */
+static DH *
+load_dh_file (int keylength)
+{
+ struct passwd *pwd;
+ FILE *fp;
+ char fnbuf[2048];
+ DH *dh = NULL;
+ int codes;
+
+ if ((pwd = getpwuid(getuid())) == NULL)
+ return NULL;
+
+ /* attempt to open file. It's not an error if it doesn't exist. */
+ snprintf(fnbuf, sizeof fnbuf, "%s/.postgresql/dh%d.pem",
+ pwd->pw_dir, keylength);
+ if ((fp = fopen(fnbuf, "r")) == NULL)
+ return NULL;
+
+/* flock(fileno(fp), LOCK_SH); */
+ dh = PEM_read_DHparams(fp, NULL, NULL, NULL);
+/* flock(fileno(fp), LOCK_UN); */
+ fclose(fp);
+
+ /* is the prime the correct size? */
+ if (dh != NULL && 8*DH_size(dh) < keylength)
+ {
+ dh = NULL;
+ }
+
+ /* make sure the DH parameters are usable */
+ if (dh != NULL)
+ {
+ if (DH_check(dh, &codes))
+ {
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ if (codes & DH_CHECK_P_NOT_PRIME)
+ {
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ if ((codes & DH_NOT_SUITABLE_GENERATOR) &&
+ (codes & DH_CHECK_P_NOT_SAFE_PRIME))
+ {
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ }
+
+ return dh;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Load hardcoded DH parameters.
+ *
+ * To prevent problems if the DH parameters files don't even
+ * exist, we can load DH parameters hardcoded into this file.
+ */
+static DH *
+load_dh_buffer (const char *buffer, size_t len)
+{
+ BIO *bio;
+ DH *dh = NULL;
+
+ bio = BIO_new_mem_buf((char *) buffer, len);
+ if (bio == NULL)
+ return NULL;
+ dh = PEM_read_bio_DHparams(bio, NULL, NULL, NULL);
+ BIO_free(bio);
+
+ return dh;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Generate an empheral DH key. Because this can take a long
+ * time to compute, we can use precomputed parameters of the
+ * common key sizes.
+ *
+ * Since few sites will bother to precompute these parameter
+ * files, we also provide a fallback to the parameters provided
+ * by the OpenSSL project.
+ *
+ * These values can be static (once loaded or computed) since
+ * the OpenSSL library can efficiently generate random keys from
+ * the information provided.
+ */
+static DH *
+tmp_dh_cb (SSL *s, int is_export, int keylength)
+{
+ DH *r = NULL;
+ static DH *dh = NULL;
+ static DH *dh512 = NULL;
+ static DH *dh1024 = NULL;
+ static DH *dh2048 = NULL;
+ static DH *dh4096 = NULL;
+
+ switch (keylength)
+ {
+ case 512:
+ if (dh512 == NULL)
+ dh512 = load_dh_file(keylength);
+ if (dh512 == NULL)
+ dh512 = load_dh_buffer(file_dh512, sizeof file_dh512);
+ r = dh512;
+ break;
+
+ case 1024:
+ if (dh1024 == NULL)
+ dh1024 = load_dh_file(keylength);
+ if (dh1024 == NULL)
+ dh1024 = load_dh_buffer(file_dh1024, sizeof file_dh1024);
+ r = dh1024;
+ break;
+
+ case 2048:
+ if (dh2048 == NULL)
+ dh2048 = load_dh_file(keylength);
+ if (dh2048 == NULL)
+ dh2048 = load_dh_buffer(file_dh2048, sizeof file_dh2048);
+ r = dh2048;
+ break;
+
+ case 4096:
+ if (dh4096 == NULL)
+ dh4096 = load_dh_file(keylength);
+ if (dh4096 == NULL)
+ dh4096 = load_dh_buffer(file_dh4096, sizeof file_dh4096);
+ r = dh4096;
+ break;
+
+ default:
+ if (dh == NULL)
+ dh = load_dh_file(keylength);
+ r = dh;
+ }
+
+ /* this may take a long time, but it may be necessary... */
+ if (r == NULL || 8*DH_size(r) < keylength)
+ {
+ r = DH_generate_parameters(keylength, DH_GENERATOR_2, NULL, NULL);
+ }
+
+ return r;
+}
+
/*
* Initialize global SSL context.
*/
SSL_VERIFY_PEER | SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT, verify_cb);
SSL_CTX_set_verify_depth(SSL_context, 1);
+ /* set up empheral DH keys */
+ SSL_CTX_set_tmp_dh_callback(SSL_context, tmp_dh_cb);
+ SSL_CTX_set_options(SSL_context, SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE);
+
return 0;
}
projects / users / c2main / postgres.git / commitdiff