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pgcrypto had internal implementations of some encryption algorithms,
as an alternative to calling out to OpenSSL. These were rarely used,
since most production installations are built with OpenSSL. Moreover,
maintaining parallel code paths makes the code more complex and
difficult to maintain.
This patch removes these internal implementations. Now, pgcrypto is
only built if OpenSSL support is configured.
Reviewed-by: Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
Discussion: https://www.postgresql.org/message-id/flat/0b42f1df-8cba-6a30-77d7-acc241cc88c1%40enterprisedb.com
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With its current design, a careless use of pg_cryptohash_final() could
would result in an out-of-bound write in memory as the size of the
destination buffer to store the result digest is not known to the
cryptohash internals, without the caller knowing about that. This
commit adds a new argument to pg_cryptohash_final() to allow such sanity
checks, and implements such defenses.
The internals of SCRAM for HMAC could be tightened a bit more, but as
everything is based on SCRAM_KEY_LEN with uses particular to this code
there is no need to complicate its interface more than necessary, and
this comes back to the refactoring of HMAC in core. Except that, this
minimizes the uses of the existing DIGEST_LENGTH variables, relying
instead on sizeof() for the result sizes. In ossp-uuid, this also makes
the code more defensive, as it already relied on dce_uuid_t being at
least the size of a MD5 digest.
This is in philosophy similar to cfc40d3 for base64.c and aef8948 for
hex.c.
Reported-by: Ranier Vilela
Author: Michael Paquier, Ranier Vilela
Reviewed-by: Kyotaro Horiguchi
Discussion: https://postgr.es/m/CAEudQAoqEGmcff3J4sTSV-R_16Monuz-UpJFbf_dnVH=APr02Q@mail.gmail.com
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With this commit, SHA1 goes through the implementation provided by
OpenSSL via EVP when building the backend with it, and uses as fallback
implementation KAME which was located in pgcrypto and already shaped for
an integration with a set of init, update and final routines.
Structures and routines have been renamed to make things consistent with
the fallback implementations of MD5 and SHA2.
uuid-ossp has used for ages a shortcut with pgcrypto to fetch a copy of
SHA1 if needed. This was built depending on the build options within
./configure, so this cleans up some code and removes the build
dependency between pgcrypto and uuid-ossp.
Note that this will help with the refactoring of HMAC, as pgcrypto
offers the option to use MD5, SHA1 or SHA2, so only the second option
was missing to make that possible.
Author: Michael Paquier
Reviewed-by: Heikki Linnakangas
Discussion: https://postgr.es/m/X9HXKTgrvJvYO7Oh@paquier.xyz
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This commit addresses two issues:
- In pgcrypto, MD5 computation called pg_cryptohash_{init,update,final}
without checking for the result status.
- Simplify pg_checksum_raw_context to use only one variable for all the
SHA2 options available in checksum manifests.
Reported-by: Heikki Linnakangas
Discussion: https://postgr.es/m/f62f26bb-47a5-8411-46e5-4350823e06a5@iki.fi
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This adjusts some code related to recent changes for cryptohash
functions:
- Add a variable in md5.h to track down the size of a computed result,
moved from pgcrypto. Note that pg_md5_hash() assumed a result of this
size already.
- Call explicit_bzero() on the hashed data when freeing the context for
fallback implementations. For MD5, particularly, it would be annoying
to leave some non-zeroed data around.
- Clean up some code related to recent changes of uuid-ossp. .gitignore
still included md5.c and a comment was incorrect.
Discussion: https://postgr.es/m/X9HXKTgrvJvYO7Oh@paquier.xyz
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This commit heavily reorganizes the MD5 implementations that exist in
the tree in various aspects.
First, MD5 is added to the list of options available in cryptohash.c and
cryptohash_openssl.c. This means that if building with OpenSSL, EVP is
used for MD5 instead of the fallback implementation that Postgres had
for ages. With the recent refactoring work for cryptohash functions,
this change is straight-forward. If not building with OpenSSL, a
fallback implementation internal to src/common/ is used.
Second, this reduces the number of MD5 implementations present in the
tree from two to one, by moving the KAME implementation from pgcrypto to
src/common/, and by removing the implementation that existed in
src/common/. KAME was already structured with an init/update/final set
of routines by pgcrypto (see original pgcrypto/md5.h) for compatibility
with OpenSSL, so moving it to src/common/ has proved to be a
straight-forward move, requiring no actual manipulation of the internals
of each routine. Some benchmarking has not shown any performance gap
between both implementations.
Similarly to the fallback implementation used for SHA2, the fallback
implementation of MD5 is moved to src/common/md5.c with an internal
header called md5_int.h for the init, update and final routines. This
gets then consumed by cryptohash.c.
The original routines used for MD5-hashed passwords are moved to a
separate file called md5_common.c, also in src/common/, aimed at being
shared between all MD5 implementations as utility routines to keep
compatibility with any code relying on them.
Like the SHA2 changes, this commit had its round of tests on both Linux
and Windows, across all versions of OpenSSL supported on HEAD, with and
even without OpenSSL.
Author: Michael Paquier
Reviewed-by: Daniel Gustafsson
Discussion: https://postgr.es/m/20201106073434.GA4961@paquier.xyz
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PX_OWN_ALLOC was intended as a way to disable the use of palloc(), and
over the time new palloc() or equivalent calls have been added like in
32984d8, making this extra layer losing its original purpose. This
simplifies on the way some code paths to use palloc0() rather than
palloc() followed by memset(0).
Author: Daniel Gustafsson
Discussion: https://postgr.es/m/A5BFAA1A-B2E8-4CBC-895E-7B1B9475A527@yesql.se
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The basic rule we follow here is to always first include 'postgres.h' or
'postgres_fe.h' whichever is applicable, then system header includes and
then Postgres header includes. In this, we also follow that all the
Postgres header includes are in order based on their ASCII value. We
generally follow these rules, but the code has deviated in many places.
This commit makes it consistent just for contrib modules. The later
commits will enforce similar rules in other parts of code.
Author: Vignesh C
Reviewed-by: Amit Kapila
Discussion: https://postgr.es/m/CALDaNm2Sznv8RR6Ex-iJO6xAdsxgWhCoETkaYX=+9DW3q0QCfA@mail.gmail.com
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This addresses some issues with unnecessary code comments, fixes various
typos in docs and comments, and removes some orphaned structures and
definitions.
Author: Alexander Lakhin
Discussion: https://postgr.es/m/9aabc775-5494-b372-8bcb-4dfc0bd37c68@gmail.com
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Change pg_bsd_indent to follow upstream rules for placement of comments
to the right of code, and remove pgindent hack that caused comments
following #endif to not obey the general rule.
Commit e3860ffa4dd0dad0dd9eea4be9cc1412373a8c89 wasn't actually using
the published version of pg_bsd_indent, but a hacked-up version that
tried to minimize the amount of movement of comments to the right of
code. The situation of interest is where such a comment has to be
moved to the right of its default placement at column 33 because there's
code there. BSD indent has always moved right in units of tab stops
in such cases --- but in the previous incarnation, indent was working
in 8-space tab stops, while now it knows we use 4-space tabs. So the
net result is that in about half the cases, such comments are placed
one tab stop left of before. This is better all around: it leaves
more room on the line for comment text, and it means that in such
cases the comment uniformly starts at the next 4-space tab stop after
the code, rather than sometimes one and sometimes two tabs after.
Also, ensure that comments following #endif are indented the same
as comments following other preprocessor commands such as #else.
That inconsistency turns out to have been self-inflicted damage
from a poorly-thought-through post-indent "fixup" in pgindent.
This patch is much less interesting than the first round of indent
changes, but also bulkier, so I thought it best to separate the effects.
Discussion: https://postgr.es/m/E1dAmxK-0006EE-1r@gemulon.postgresql.org
Discussion: https://postgr.es/m/30527.1495162840@sss.pgh.pa.us
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The new indent version includes numerous fixes thanks to Piotr Stefaniak.
The main changes visible in this commit are:
* Nicer formatting of function-pointer declarations.
* No longer unexpectedly removes spaces in expressions using casts,
sizeof, or offsetof.
* No longer wants to add a space in "struct structname *varname", as
well as some similar cases for const- or volatile-qualified pointers.
* Declarations using PG_USED_FOR_ASSERTS_ONLY are formatted more nicely.
* Fixes bug where comments following declarations were sometimes placed
with no space separating them from the code.
* Fixes some odd decisions for comments following case labels.
* Fixes some cases where comments following code were indented to less
than the expected column 33.
On the less good side, it now tends to put more whitespace around typedef
names that are not listed in typedefs.list. This might encourage us to
put more effort into typedef name collection; it's not really a bug in
indent itself.
There are more changes coming after this round, having to do with comment
indentation and alignment of lines appearing within parentheses. I wanted
to limit the size of the diffs to something that could be reviewed without
one's eyes completely glazing over, so it seemed better to split up the
changes as much as practical.
Discussion: https://postgr.es/m/E1dAmxK-0006EE-1r@gemulon.postgresql.org
Discussion: https://postgr.es/m/30527.1495162840@sss.pgh.pa.us
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This adds a new routine, pg_strong_random() for generating random bytes,
for use in both frontend and backend. At the moment, it's only used in
the backend, but the upcoming SCRAM authentication patches need strong
random numbers in libpq as well.
pg_strong_random() is based on, and replaces, the existing implementation
in pgcrypto. It can acquire strong random numbers from a number of sources,
depending on what's available:
- OpenSSL RAND_bytes(), if built with OpenSSL
- On Windows, the native cryptographic functions are used
- /dev/urandom
Unlike the current pgcrypto function, the source is chosen by configure.
That makes it easier to test different implementations, and ensures that
we don't accidentally fall back to a less secure implementation, if the
primary source fails. All of those methods are quite reliable, it would be
pretty surprising for them to fail, so we'd rather find out by failing
hard.
If no strong random source is available, we fall back to using erand48(),
seeded from current timestamp, like PostmasterRandom() was. That isn't
cryptographically secure, but allows us to still work on platforms that
don't have any of the above stronger sources. Because it's not very secure,
the built-in implementation is only used if explicitly requested with
--disable-strong-random.
This replaces the more complicated Fortuna algorithm we used to have in
pgcrypto, which is unfortunate, but all modern platforms have /dev/urandom,
so it doesn't seem worth the maintenance effort to keep that. pgcrypto
functions that require strong random numbers will be disabled with
--disable-strong-random.
Original patch by Magnus Hagander, tons of further work by Michael Paquier
and me.
Discussion: https://www.postgresql.org/message-id/CAB7nPqRy3krN8quR9XujMVVHYtXJ0_60nqgVc6oUk8ygyVkZsA@mail.gmail.com
Discussion: https://www.postgresql.org/message-id/CAB7nPqRWkNYRRPJA7-cF+LfroYV10pvjdz6GNvxk-Eee9FypKA@mail.gmail.com
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randomness."
This reverts commit 9e083fd4683294f41544e6d0d72f6e258ff3a77c. That was a
few bricks shy of a load:
* Query cancel stopped working
* Buildfarm member pademelon stopped working, because the box doesn't have
/dev/urandom nor /dev/random.
This clearly needs some more discussion, and a quite different patch, so
revert for now.
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This adds a new routine, pg_strong_random() for generating random bytes,
for use in both frontend and backend. At the moment, it's only used in
the backend, but the upcoming SCRAM authentication patches need strong
random numbers in libpq as well.
pg_strong_random() is based on, and replaces, the existing implementation
in pgcrypto. It can acquire strong random numbers from a number of sources,
depending on what's available:
- OpenSSL RAND_bytes(), if built with OpenSSL
- On Windows, the native cryptographic functions are used
- /dev/urandom
- /dev/random
Original patch by Magnus Hagander, with further work by Michael Paquier
and me.
Discussion: <CAB7nPqRy3krN8quR9XujMVVHYtXJ0_60nqgVc6oUk8ygyVkZsA@mail.gmail.com>
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Changes needed to build at all:
- Check for SSL_new in configure, now that SSL_library_init is a macro.
- Do not access struct members directly. This includes some new code in
pgcrypto, to use the resource owner mechanism to ensure that we don't
leak OpenSSL handles, now that we can't embed them in other structs
anymore.
- RAND_SSLeay() -> RAND_OpenSSL()
Changes that were needed to silence deprecation warnings, but were not
strictly necessary:
- RAND_pseudo_bytes() -> RAND_bytes().
- SSL_library_init() and OpenSSL_config() -> OPENSSL_init_ssl()
- ASN1_STRING_data() -> ASN1_STRING_get0_data()
- DH_generate_parameters() -> DH_generate_parameters()
- Locking callbacks are not needed with OpenSSL 1.1.0 anymore. (Good
riddance!)
Also change references to SSLEAY_VERSION_NUMBER with OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER,
for the sake of consistency. OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER has existed since time
immemorial.
Fix SSL test suite to work with OpenSSL 1.1.0. CA certificates must have
the "CA:true" basic constraint extension now, or OpenSSL will refuse them.
Regenerate the test certificates with that. The "openssl" binary, used to
generate the certificates, is also now more picky, and throws an error
if an X509 extension is specified in "req_extensions", but that section
is empty.
Backpatch to all supported branches, per popular demand. In back-branches,
we still support OpenSSL 0.9.7 and above. OpenSSL 0.9.6 should still work
too, but I didn't test it. In master, we only support 0.9.8 and above.
Patch by Andreas Karlsson, with additional changes by me.
Discussion: <20160627151604.GD1051@msg.df7cb.de>
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This includes removing tabs after periods in C comments, which was
applied to back branches, so this change should not effect backpatching.
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Specifically, on-stack memset() might be removed, so:
* Replace memset() with px_memset()
* Add px_memset to copy_crlf()
* Add px_memset to pgp-s2k.c
Patch by Marko Kreen
Report by PVS-Studio
Backpatch through 8.4.
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Always compare the return value to 0, don't use cute tricks like
if (!strcmp(...)).
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provided by Andrew.
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data structures and backend internal APIs. This solves problems we've seen
recently with inconsistent layout of pg_control between machines that have
32-bit time_t and those that have already migrated to 64-bit time_t. Also,
we can get out from under the problem that Windows' Unix-API emulation is not
consistent about the width of time_t.
There are a few remaining places where local time_t variables are used to hold
the current or recent result of time(NULL). I didn't bother changing these
since they do not affect any cross-module APIs and surely all platforms will
have 64-bit time_t before overflow becomes an actual risk. time_t should
be avoided for anything visible to extension modules, however.
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from PuTTY with is under minimal BSD/MIT license. Marko Kreen.
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Few cleanups and couple of new things:
- add SHA2 algorithm to older OpenSSL
- add BIGNUM math to have public-key cryptography work on non-OpenSSL
build.
- gen_random_bytes() function
The status of SHA2 algoritms and public-key encryption can now be
changed to 'always available.'
That makes pgcrypto functionally complete and unless there will be new
editions of AES, SHA2 or OpenPGP standards, there is no major changes
planned.
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be more wary about having a value for BYTE_ORDER, clean up randomly-
chosen ways of including Postgres core headers.
Marko Kreen and Tom Lane
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- Move openssl random provider to openssl.c and builtin provider
to internal.c
- Make px_random_bytes use Fortuna, instead of giving error.
- Retarget random.c to aquiring system randomness, for initial seeding
of Fortuna. There is ATM 2 functions for Windows,
reader from /dev/urandom and the regular time()/getpid() silliness.
Marko Kreen
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New hashes: SHA256, SHA384, SHA512.
Marko Kreen
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* Use error codes instead of -1
* px_strerror for new error codes
* calling convention change for px_gen_salt - return error code
* use px_strerror in pgcrypto.c
Marko Kreen
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It was a bad style to begin with, and now several loops can be clearer.
* pgcrypto.c: Fix function comments
* crypt-gensalt.c, crypt-blowfish.c: stop messing with errno
* openssl.c: use px_free instead pfree
* px.h: make redefining px_alloc/px_realloc/px_free easier
Marko Kreen
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writing 'foo()' rather than 'foo(void)'.
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conversion of basic ASCII letters. Remove all uses of strcasecmp and
strncasecmp in favor of new functions pg_strcasecmp and pg_strncasecmp;
remove most but not all direct uses of toupper and tolower in favor of
pg_toupper and pg_tolower. These functions use the same notions of
case folding already developed for identifier case conversion. I left
the straight locale-based folding in place for situations where we are
just manipulating user data and not trying to match it to built-in
strings --- for example, the SQL upper() function is still locale
dependent. Perhaps this will prove not to be what's wanted, but at
the moment we can initdb and pass regression tests in Turkish locale.
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wrote:
> > > Just testing pgcrypto on freebsd/alpha. I get some warnings:
> > They should be harmless, although I should fix them.
>
> The actual code is:
>
> if ((dlen & 15) || (((unsigned) res) & 3))
> return -1;
> Hard to imagine how (uint *) & 3 makes any sense, unless res isn't
> always a (uint8 *). Is that true?
At some point it was casted to (uint32*) so I wanted to be sure its ok.
ATM its pointless. Please apply the following patch.
--
marko
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should be all.
Marko Kreen
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failures on FreeBSD. This patch replaces uint -> unsigned.
This was reported by Daniel Holtzman against 0.4pre3 standalone
package, but it needs fixing in contrib/pgcrypto too.
Marko Kreen
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initdb/regression tests pass.
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spacing. Also adds space for one-line comments.
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tests pass.
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* remove support for encode() as it is in main tree now
* remove krb5.c
* new 'PX library' architecture
* remove BSD license from my code to let the general
PostgreSQL one to apply
* md5, sha1: ANSIfy, use const where appropriate
* various other formatting and clarity changes
* hmac()
* UN*X-like crypt() - system or internal crypt
* Internal crypt: DES, Extended DES, MD5, Blowfish
crypt-des.c, crypt-md5.c from FreeBSD
crypt-blowfish.c from Solar Designer
* gen_salt() for crypt() - Blowfish, MD5, DES, Extended DES
* encrypt(), decrypt(), encrypt_iv(), decrypt_iv()
* Cipher support in mhash.c, openssl.c
* internal: Blowfish, Rijndael-128 ciphers
* blf.[ch], rijndael.[ch] from OpenBSD
* there will be generated file rijndael-tbl.inc.
Marko Kreen
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are now separate files "postgres.h" and "postgres_fe.h", which are meant
to be the primary include files for backend .c files and frontend .c files
respectively. By default, only include files meant for frontend use are
installed into the installation include directory. There is a new make
target 'make install-all-headers' that adds the whole content of the
src/include tree to the installed fileset, for use by people who want to
develop server-side code without keeping the complete source tree on hand.
Cleaned up a whole lot of crufty and inconsistent header inclusions.
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