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Diffstat (limited to 'contrib/pgcrypto/pgp-decrypt.c')
-rw-r--r--contrib/pgcrypto/pgp-decrypt.c281
1 files changed, 156 insertions, 125 deletions
diff --git a/contrib/pgcrypto/pgp-decrypt.c b/contrib/pgcrypto/pgp-decrypt.c
index 16ae78200bc..63f832e2ce1 100644
--- a/contrib/pgcrypto/pgp-decrypt.c
+++ b/contrib/pgcrypto/pgp-decrypt.c
@@ -26,7 +26,7 @@
* OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
* SUCH DAMAGE.
*
- * $PostgreSQL: pgsql/contrib/pgcrypto/pgp-decrypt.c,v 1.5 2005/09/24 19:14:04 tgl Exp $
+ * $PostgreSQL: pgsql/contrib/pgcrypto/pgp-decrypt.c,v 1.6 2005/10/15 02:49:06 momjian Exp $
*/
#include "postgres.h"
@@ -80,7 +80,7 @@ parse_new_len(PullFilter * src, int *len_p)
len = 1 << (b & 0x1F);
pkttype = PKT_STREAM;
}
-
+
if (len < 0 || len > MAX_CHUNK)
{
px_debug("parse_new_len: weird length");
@@ -130,7 +130,7 @@ pgp_parse_pkt_hdr(PullFilter * src, uint8 *tag, int *len_p, int allow_ctx)
{
int lentype;
int res;
- uint8 *p;
+ uint8 *p;
/* EOF is normal here, thus we dont use GETBYTE */
res = pullf_read(src, 1, &p);
@@ -165,15 +165,17 @@ pgp_parse_pkt_hdr(PullFilter * src, uint8 *tag, int *len_p, int allow_ctx)
/*
* Packet reader
*/
-struct PktData {
- int type;
- int len;
+struct PktData
+{
+ int type;
+ int len;
};
-static int pktreader_pull(void *priv, PullFilter *src, int len,
- uint8 **data_p, uint8 *buf, int buflen)
+static int
+pktreader_pull(void *priv, PullFilter * src, int len,
+ uint8 **data_p, uint8 *buf, int buflen)
{
- int res;
+ int res;
struct PktData *pkt = priv;
/* PKT_CONTEXT means: whatever there is */
@@ -207,6 +209,7 @@ static void
pktreader_free(void *priv)
{
struct PktData *pkt = priv;
+
memset(pkt, 0, sizeof(*pkt));
px_free(pkt);
}
@@ -217,11 +220,12 @@ static struct PullFilterOps pktreader_filter = {
/* needs helper function to pass several parameters */
int
-pgp_create_pkt_reader(PullFilter **pf_p, PullFilter *src, int len,
- int pkttype, PGP_Context *ctx)
+pgp_create_pkt_reader(PullFilter ** pf_p, PullFilter * src, int len,
+ int pkttype, PGP_Context * ctx)
{
- int res;
+ int res;
struct PktData *pkt = px_alloc(sizeof(*pkt));
+
pkt->type = pkttype;
pkt->len = len;
res = pullf_create(pf_p, &pktreader_filter, pkt, src);
@@ -234,13 +238,14 @@ pgp_create_pkt_reader(PullFilter **pf_p, PullFilter *src, int len,
* Prefix check filter
*/
-static int prefix_init(void **priv_p, void *arg, PullFilter *src)
+static int
+prefix_init(void **priv_p, void *arg, PullFilter * src)
{
PGP_Context *ctx = arg;
- int len;
- int res;
- uint8 *buf;
- uint8 tmpbuf[PGP_MAX_BLOCK + 2];
+ int len;
+ int res;
+ uint8 *buf;
+ uint8 tmpbuf[PGP_MAX_BLOCK + 2];
len = pgp_get_cipher_block_size(ctx->cipher_algo);
if (len > sizeof(tmpbuf))
@@ -259,20 +264,19 @@ static int prefix_init(void **priv_p, void *arg, PullFilter *src)
if (buf[len - 2] != buf[len] || buf[len - 1] != buf[len + 1])
{
px_debug("prefix_init: corrupt prefix");
+
/*
- * The original purpose of the 2-byte check was
- * to show user a friendly "wrong key" message.
- * This made following possible:
+ * The original purpose of the 2-byte check was to show user a
+ * friendly "wrong key" message. This made following possible:
*
- * "An Attack on CFB Mode Encryption As Used By OpenPGP"
- * by Serge Mister and Robert Zuccherato
+ * "An Attack on CFB Mode Encryption As Used By OpenPGP" by Serge Mister
+ * and Robert Zuccherato
*
- * To avoid being 'oracle', we delay reporting, which
- * basically means we prefer to run into corrupt packet
- * header.
+ * To avoid being 'oracle', we delay reporting, which basically means we
+ * prefer to run into corrupt packet header.
*
- * We _could_ throw PXE_PGP_CORRUPT_DATA here, but
- * there is possibility of attack via timing, so we don't.
+ * We _could_ throw PXE_PGP_CORRUPT_DATA here, but there is possibility
+ * of attack via timing, so we don't.
*/
ctx->corrupt_prefix = 1;
}
@@ -289,9 +293,10 @@ static struct PullFilterOps prefix_filter = {
* Decrypt filter
*/
-static int decrypt_init(void **priv_p, void *arg, PullFilter *src)
+static int
+decrypt_init(void **priv_p, void *arg, PullFilter * src)
{
- PGP_CFB *cfb = arg;
+ PGP_CFB *cfb = arg;
*priv_p = cfb;
@@ -299,15 +304,17 @@ static int decrypt_init(void **priv_p, void *arg, PullFilter *src)
return 4096;
}
-static int decrypt_read(void *priv, PullFilter *src, int len,
- uint8 **data_p, uint8 *buf, int buflen)
+static int
+decrypt_read(void *priv, PullFilter * src, int len,
+ uint8 **data_p, uint8 *buf, int buflen)
{
- PGP_CFB *cfb = priv;
- uint8 *tmp;
- int res;
+ PGP_CFB *cfb = priv;
+ uint8 *tmp;
+ int res;
res = pullf_read(src, len, &tmp);
- if (res > 0) {
+ if (res > 0)
+ {
pgp_cfb_decrypt(cfb, tmp, res, buf);
*data_p = buf;
}
@@ -323,28 +330,33 @@ struct PullFilterOps pgp_decrypt_filter = {
* MDC hasher filter
*/
-static int mdc_init(void **priv_p, void *arg, PullFilter *src)
+static int
+mdc_init(void **priv_p, void *arg, PullFilter * src)
{
PGP_Context *ctx = arg;
+
*priv_p = ctx;
return pgp_load_digest(PGP_DIGEST_SHA1, &ctx->mdc_ctx);
}
-static void mdc_free(void *priv)
+static void
+mdc_free(void *priv)
{
PGP_Context *ctx = priv;
+
if (ctx->use_mdcbuf_filter)
return;
px_md_free(ctx->mdc_ctx);
ctx->mdc_ctx = NULL;
}
-static int mdc_finish(PGP_Context *ctx, PullFilter *src,
- int len, uint8 **data_p)
+static int
+mdc_finish(PGP_Context * ctx, PullFilter * src,
+ int len, uint8 **data_p)
{
- int res;
- uint8 hash[20];
- uint8 tmpbuf[22];
+ int res;
+ uint8 hash[20];
+ uint8 tmpbuf[22];
if (len + 1 > sizeof(tmpbuf))
return PXE_BUG;
@@ -362,7 +374,7 @@ static int mdc_finish(PGP_Context *ctx, PullFilter *src,
}
return 0;
}
-
+
/* safety check */
if (ctx->in_mdc_pkt > 1)
{
@@ -370,14 +382,14 @@ static int mdc_finish(PGP_Context *ctx, PullFilter *src,
return PXE_PGP_CORRUPT_DATA;
}
ctx->in_mdc_pkt++;
-
+
/* is the packet sane? */
if (res != 20)
{
px_debug("mdc_finish: read failed, res=%d", res);
return PXE_PGP_CORRUPT_DATA;
}
-
+
/*
* ok, we got the hash, now check
*/
@@ -394,10 +406,11 @@ static int mdc_finish(PGP_Context *ctx, PullFilter *src,
return len;
}
-static int mdc_read(void *priv, PullFilter *src, int len,
- uint8 **data_p, uint8 *buf, int buflen)
+static int
+mdc_read(void *priv, PullFilter * src, int len,
+ uint8 **data_p, uint8 *buf, int buflen)
{
- int res;
+ int res;
PGP_Context *ctx = priv;
/* skip this filter? */
@@ -434,18 +447,20 @@ static struct PullFilterOps mdc_filter = {
* packet, which is silly.
*/
#define MDCBUF_LEN 8192
-struct MDCBufData {
+struct MDCBufData
+{
PGP_Context *ctx;
- int eof;
- int buflen;
- int avail;
- uint8 *pos;
- int mdc_avail;
- uint8 mdc_buf[22];
- uint8 buf[MDCBUF_LEN];
+ int eof;
+ int buflen;
+ int avail;
+ uint8 *pos;
+ int mdc_avail;
+ uint8 mdc_buf[22];
+ uint8 buf[MDCBUF_LEN];
};
-static int mdcbuf_init(void **priv_p, void *arg, PullFilter *src)
+static int
+mdcbuf_init(void **priv_p, void *arg, PullFilter * src)
{
PGP_Context *ctx = arg;
struct MDCBufData *st;
@@ -462,10 +477,11 @@ static int mdcbuf_init(void **priv_p, void *arg, PullFilter *src)
return 0;
}
-static int mdcbuf_finish(struct MDCBufData *st)
+static int
+mdcbuf_finish(struct MDCBufData * st)
{
- uint8 hash[20];
- int res;
+ uint8 hash[20];
+ int res;
st->eof = 1;
@@ -486,25 +502,29 @@ static int mdcbuf_finish(struct MDCBufData *st)
return res;
}
-static void mdcbuf_load_data(struct MDCBufData *st, uint8 *src, int len)
+static void
+mdcbuf_load_data(struct MDCBufData * st, uint8 *src, int len)
{
- uint8 *dst = st->pos + st->avail;
+ uint8 *dst = st->pos + st->avail;
+
memcpy(dst, src, len);
px_md_update(st->ctx->mdc_ctx, src, len);
st->avail += len;
}
-static void mdcbuf_load_mdc(struct MDCBufData *st, uint8 *src, int len)
+static void
+mdcbuf_load_mdc(struct MDCBufData * st, uint8 *src, int len)
{
memmove(st->mdc_buf + st->mdc_avail, src, len);
st->mdc_avail += len;
}
-static int mdcbuf_refill(struct MDCBufData *st, PullFilter *src)
+static int
+mdcbuf_refill(struct MDCBufData * st, PullFilter * src)
{
- uint8 *data;
- int res;
- int need;
+ uint8 *data;
+ int res;
+ int need;
/* put avail data in start */
if (st->avail > 0 && st->pos != st->buf)
@@ -530,7 +550,8 @@ static int mdcbuf_refill(struct MDCBufData *st, PullFilter *src)
}
else
{
- int canmove = st->mdc_avail + res - 22;
+ int canmove = st->mdc_avail + res - 22;
+
if (canmove > 0)
{
mdcbuf_load_data(st, st->mdc_buf, canmove);
@@ -542,11 +563,12 @@ static int mdcbuf_refill(struct MDCBufData *st, PullFilter *src)
return 0;
}
-static int mdcbuf_read(void *priv, PullFilter *src, int len,
- uint8 **data_p, uint8 *buf, int buflen)
+static int
+mdcbuf_read(void *priv, PullFilter * src, int len,
+ uint8 **data_p, uint8 *buf, int buflen)
{
struct MDCBufData *st = priv;
- int res;
+ int res;
if (!st->eof && len > st->avail)
{
@@ -568,6 +590,7 @@ static void
mdcbuf_free(void *priv)
{
struct MDCBufData *st = priv;
+
px_md_free(st->ctx->mdc_ctx);
st->ctx->mdc_ctx = NULL;
memset(st, 0, sizeof(*st));
@@ -583,29 +606,30 @@ static struct PullFilterOps mdcbuf_filter = {
* Decrypt separate session key
*/
static int
-decrypt_key(PGP_Context *ctx, const uint8 *src, int len)
+decrypt_key(PGP_Context * ctx, const uint8 *src, int len)
{
- int res;
- uint8 algo;
- PGP_CFB *cfb;
-
+ int res;
+ uint8 algo;
+ PGP_CFB *cfb;
+
res = pgp_cfb_create(&cfb, ctx->s2k_cipher_algo,
- ctx->s2k.key, ctx->s2k.key_len, 0, NULL);
+ ctx->s2k.key, ctx->s2k.key_len, 0, NULL);
if (res < 0)
return res;
pgp_cfb_decrypt(cfb, src, 1, &algo);
- src ++;
- len --;
+ src++;
+ len--;
pgp_cfb_decrypt(cfb, src, len, ctx->sess_key);
pgp_cfb_free(cfb);
ctx->sess_key_len = len;
ctx->cipher_algo = algo;
- if (pgp_get_cipher_key_size(algo) != len) {
+ if (pgp_get_cipher_key_size(algo) != len)
+ {
px_debug("sesskey bad len: algo=%d, expected=%d, got=%d",
- algo, pgp_get_cipher_key_size(algo), len);
+ algo, pgp_get_cipher_key_size(algo), len);
return PXE_PGP_CORRUPT_DATA;
}
return 0;
@@ -643,7 +667,7 @@ parse_symenc_sesskey(PGP_Context * ctx, PullFilter * src)
* generate key from password
*/
res = pgp_s2k_process(&ctx->s2k, ctx->s2k_cipher_algo,
- ctx->sym_key, ctx->sym_key_len);
+ ctx->sym_key, ctx->sym_key_len);
if (res < 0)
return res;
@@ -684,21 +708,23 @@ parse_symenc_sesskey(PGP_Context * ctx, PullFilter * src)
}
static int
-copy_crlf(MBuf *dst, uint8 *data, int len, int *got_cr)
+copy_crlf(MBuf * dst, uint8 *data, int len, int *got_cr)
{
- uint8 *data_end = data + len;
- uint8 tmpbuf[1024];
- uint8 *tmp_end = tmpbuf + sizeof(tmpbuf);
- uint8 *p;
- int res;
+ uint8 *data_end = data + len;
+ uint8 tmpbuf[1024];
+ uint8 *tmp_end = tmpbuf + sizeof(tmpbuf);
+ uint8 *p;
+ int res;
p = tmpbuf;
- if (*got_cr) {
+ if (*got_cr)
+ {
if (*data != '\n')
*p++ = '\r';
*got_cr = 0;
}
- while (data < data_end) {
+ while (data < data_end)
+ {
if (*data == '\r')
{
if (data + 1 < data_end)
@@ -779,8 +805,9 @@ parse_literal_data(PGP_Context * ctx, MBuf * dst, PullFilter * pkt)
ctx->unicode_mode = (type == 'u') ? 1 : 0;
/* read data */
- while (1) {
- res = pullf_read(pkt, 32*1024, &buf);
+ while (1)
+ {
+ res = pullf_read(pkt, 32 * 1024, &buf);
if (res <= 0)
break;
@@ -797,8 +824,8 @@ parse_literal_data(PGP_Context * ctx, MBuf * dst, PullFilter * pkt)
}
/* process_data_packets and parse_compressed_data call each other */
-static int process_data_packets(PGP_Context * ctx, MBuf * dst,
- PullFilter * src, int allow_compr, int need_mdc);
+static int process_data_packets(PGP_Context * ctx, MBuf * dst,
+ PullFilter * src, int allow_compr, int need_mdc);
static int
parse_compressed_data(PGP_Context * ctx, MBuf * dst, PullFilter * pkt)
@@ -822,7 +849,7 @@ parse_compressed_data(PGP_Context * ctx, MBuf * dst, PullFilter * pkt)
if (res >= 0)
{
res = process_data_packets(ctx, dst, pf_decompr,
- NO_COMPR, NO_MDC);
+ NO_COMPR, NO_MDC);
pullf_free(pf_decompr);
}
break;
@@ -850,7 +877,7 @@ process_data_packets(PGP_Context * ctx, MBuf * dst, PullFilter * src,
int got_data = 0;
int got_mdc = 0;
PullFilter *pkt = NULL;
- uint8 *tmp;
+ uint8 *tmp;
while (1)
{
@@ -951,12 +978,12 @@ static int
parse_symenc_data(PGP_Context * ctx, PullFilter * pkt, MBuf * dst)
{
int res;
- PGP_CFB *cfb = NULL;
+ PGP_CFB *cfb = NULL;
PullFilter *pf_decrypt = NULL;
PullFilter *pf_prefix = NULL;
res = pgp_cfb_create(&cfb, ctx->cipher_algo,
- ctx->sess_key, ctx->sess_key_len, 1, NULL);
+ ctx->sess_key, ctx->sess_key_len, 1, NULL);
if (res < 0)
goto out;
@@ -985,11 +1012,11 @@ static int
parse_symenc_mdc_data(PGP_Context * ctx, PullFilter * pkt, MBuf * dst)
{
int res;
- PGP_CFB *cfb = NULL;
+ PGP_CFB *cfb = NULL;
PullFilter *pf_decrypt = NULL;
PullFilter *pf_prefix = NULL;
PullFilter *pf_mdc = NULL;
- uint8 ver;
+ uint8 ver;
GETBYTE(pkt, ver);
if (ver != 1)
@@ -999,7 +1026,7 @@ parse_symenc_mdc_data(PGP_Context * ctx, PullFilter * pkt, MBuf * dst)
}
res = pgp_cfb_create(&cfb, ctx->cipher_algo,
- ctx->sess_key, ctx->sess_key_len, 0, NULL);
+ ctx->sess_key, ctx->sess_key_len, 0, NULL);
if (res < 0)
goto out;
@@ -1034,49 +1061,52 @@ out:
* skip over packet contents
*/
int
-pgp_skip_packet(PullFilter *pkt)
+pgp_skip_packet(PullFilter * pkt)
{
- int res = 1;
- uint8 *tmp;
- while (res > 0)
- res = pullf_read(pkt, 32*1024, &tmp);
- return res < 0 ? res : 0;
+ int res = 1;
+ uint8 *tmp;
+
+ while (res > 0)
+ res = pullf_read(pkt, 32 * 1024, &tmp);
+ return res < 0 ? res : 0;
}
/*
* expect to be at packet end, any data is error
*/
int
-pgp_expect_packet_end(PullFilter *pkt)
+pgp_expect_packet_end(PullFilter * pkt)
{
- int res = 1;
- uint8 *tmp;
- while (res > 0)
+ int res = 1;
+ uint8 *tmp;
+
+ while (res > 0)
{
- res = pullf_read(pkt, 32*1024, &tmp);
+ res = pullf_read(pkt, 32 * 1024, &tmp);
if (res > 0)
{
px_debug("pgp_expect_packet_end: got data");
return PXE_PGP_CORRUPT_DATA;
}
}
- return res < 0 ? res : 0;
+ return res < 0 ? res : 0;
}
int
pgp_decrypt(PGP_Context * ctx, MBuf * msrc, MBuf * mdst)
{
- int res;
+ int res;
PullFilter *src = NULL;
PullFilter *pkt = NULL;
- uint8 tag;
- int len;
- int got_key = 0;
- int got_data = 0;
+ uint8 tag;
+ int len;
+ int got_key = 0;
+ int got_data = 0;
res = pullf_create_mbuf_reader(&src, msrc);
- while (res >= 0) {
+ while (res >= 0)
+ {
res = pgp_parse_pkt_hdr(src, &tag, &len, NO_CTX_SIZE);
if (res <= 0)
break;
@@ -1086,7 +1116,8 @@ pgp_decrypt(PGP_Context * ctx, MBuf * msrc, MBuf * mdst)
break;
res = PXE_PGP_CORRUPT_DATA;
- switch (tag) {
+ switch (tag)
+ {
case PGP_PKT_MARKER:
res = pgp_skip_packet(pkt);
break;
@@ -1097,10 +1128,11 @@ pgp_decrypt(PGP_Context * ctx, MBuf * msrc, MBuf * mdst)
break;
case PGP_PKT_SYMENCRYPTED_SESSKEY:
if (got_key)
- /* Theoretically, there could be several keys,
- * both public and symmetric, all of which
- * encrypt same session key. Decrypt should try
- * with each one, before failing.
+
+ /*
+ * Theoretically, there could be several keys, both public
+ * and symmetric, all of which encrypt same session key.
+ * Decrypt should try with each one, before failing.
*/
px_debug("pgp_decrypt: using first of several keys");
else
@@ -1154,4 +1186,3 @@ pgp_decrypt(PGP_Context * ctx, MBuf * msrc, MBuf * mdst)
return res;
}
-
generated by cgit v1.2.3 (git 2.39.1) at 2025-07-16 19:47:22 +0000