diff options
-rw-r--r-- | src/backend/libpq/auth-scram.c | 22 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | src/common/hmac.c | 64 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | src/common/hmac_openssl.c | 90 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | src/common/scram-common.c | 68 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | src/include/common/hmac.h | 1 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | src/include/common/scram-common.h | 14 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | src/interfaces/libpq/fe-auth-scram.c | 76 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | src/interfaces/libpq/fe-auth.c | 10 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | src/interfaces/libpq/fe-auth.h | 3 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | src/tools/pgindent/typedefs.list | 1 |
10 files changed, 294 insertions, 55 deletions
diff --git a/src/backend/libpq/auth-scram.c b/src/backend/libpq/auth-scram.c index 7c9dee70ce7..ee7f52218ab 100644 --- a/src/backend/libpq/auth-scram.c +++ b/src/backend/libpq/auth-scram.c @@ -465,6 +465,7 @@ pg_be_scram_build_secret(const char *password) pg_saslprep_rc rc; char saltbuf[SCRAM_DEFAULT_SALT_LEN]; char *result; + const char *errstr = NULL; /* * Normalize the password with SASLprep. If that doesn't work, because @@ -482,7 +483,8 @@ pg_be_scram_build_secret(const char *password) errmsg("could not generate random salt"))); result = scram_build_secret(saltbuf, SCRAM_DEFAULT_SALT_LEN, - SCRAM_DEFAULT_ITERATIONS, password); + SCRAM_DEFAULT_ITERATIONS, password, + &errstr); if (prep_password) pfree(prep_password); @@ -509,6 +511,7 @@ scram_verify_plain_password(const char *username, const char *password, uint8 computed_key[SCRAM_KEY_LEN]; char *prep_password; pg_saslprep_rc rc; + const char *errstr = NULL; if (!parse_scram_secret(secret, &iterations, &encoded_salt, stored_key, server_key)) @@ -539,10 +542,10 @@ scram_verify_plain_password(const char *username, const char *password, /* Compute Server Key based on the user-supplied plaintext password */ if (scram_SaltedPassword(password, salt, saltlen, iterations, - salted_password) < 0 || - scram_ServerKey(salted_password, computed_key) < 0) + salted_password, &errstr) < 0 || + scram_ServerKey(salted_password, computed_key, &errstr) < 0) { - elog(ERROR, "could not compute server key"); + elog(ERROR, "could not compute server key: %s", errstr); } if (prep_password) @@ -1113,6 +1116,7 @@ verify_client_proof(scram_state *state) uint8 client_StoredKey[SCRAM_KEY_LEN]; pg_hmac_ctx *ctx = pg_hmac_create(PG_SHA256); int i; + const char *errstr = NULL; /* * Calculate ClientSignature. Note that we don't log directly a failure @@ -1133,7 +1137,8 @@ verify_client_proof(scram_state *state) strlen(state->client_final_message_without_proof)) < 0 || pg_hmac_final(ctx, ClientSignature, sizeof(ClientSignature)) < 0) { - elog(ERROR, "could not calculate client signature"); + elog(ERROR, "could not calculate client signature: %s", + pg_hmac_error(ctx)); } pg_hmac_free(ctx); @@ -1143,8 +1148,8 @@ verify_client_proof(scram_state *state) ClientKey[i] = state->ClientProof[i] ^ ClientSignature[i]; /* Hash it one more time, and compare with StoredKey */ - if (scram_H(ClientKey, SCRAM_KEY_LEN, client_StoredKey) < 0) - elog(ERROR, "could not hash stored key"); + if (scram_H(ClientKey, SCRAM_KEY_LEN, client_StoredKey, &errstr) < 0) + elog(ERROR, "could not hash stored key: %s", errstr); if (memcmp(client_StoredKey, state->StoredKey, SCRAM_KEY_LEN) != 0) return false; @@ -1389,7 +1394,8 @@ build_server_final_message(scram_state *state) strlen(state->client_final_message_without_proof)) < 0 || pg_hmac_final(ctx, ServerSignature, sizeof(ServerSignature)) < 0) { - elog(ERROR, "could not calculate server signature"); + elog(ERROR, "could not calculate server signature: %s", + pg_hmac_error(ctx)); } pg_hmac_free(ctx); diff --git a/src/common/hmac.c b/src/common/hmac.c index d40026d3e99..a27778e86b3 100644 --- a/src/common/hmac.c +++ b/src/common/hmac.c @@ -38,11 +38,21 @@ #define FREE(ptr) free(ptr) #endif +/* Set of error states */ +typedef enum pg_hmac_errno +{ + PG_HMAC_ERROR_NONE = 0, + PG_HMAC_ERROR_OOM, + PG_HMAC_ERROR_INTERNAL +} pg_hmac_errno; + /* Internal pg_hmac_ctx structure */ struct pg_hmac_ctx { pg_cryptohash_ctx *hash; pg_cryptohash_type type; + pg_hmac_errno error; + const char *errreason; int block_size; int digest_size; @@ -73,6 +83,8 @@ pg_hmac_create(pg_cryptohash_type type) return NULL; memset(ctx, 0, sizeof(pg_hmac_ctx)); ctx->type = type; + ctx->error = PG_HMAC_ERROR_NONE; + ctx->errreason = NULL; /* * Initialize the context data. This requires to know the digest and @@ -150,12 +162,16 @@ pg_hmac_init(pg_hmac_ctx *ctx, const uint8 *key, size_t len) /* temporary buffer for one-time shrink */ shrinkbuf = ALLOC(digest_size); if (shrinkbuf == NULL) + { + ctx->error = PG_HMAC_ERROR_OOM; return -1; + } memset(shrinkbuf, 0, digest_size); hash_ctx = pg_cryptohash_create(ctx->type); if (hash_ctx == NULL) { + ctx->error = PG_HMAC_ERROR_OOM; FREE(shrinkbuf); return -1; } @@ -164,6 +180,8 @@ pg_hmac_init(pg_hmac_ctx *ctx, const uint8 *key, size_t len) pg_cryptohash_update(hash_ctx, key, len) < 0 || pg_cryptohash_final(hash_ctx, shrinkbuf, digest_size) < 0) { + ctx->error = PG_HMAC_ERROR_INTERNAL; + ctx->errreason = pg_cryptohash_error(hash_ctx); pg_cryptohash_free(hash_ctx); FREE(shrinkbuf); return -1; @@ -184,6 +202,8 @@ pg_hmac_init(pg_hmac_ctx *ctx, const uint8 *key, size_t len) if (pg_cryptohash_init(ctx->hash) < 0 || pg_cryptohash_update(ctx->hash, ctx->k_ipad, ctx->block_size) < 0) { + ctx->error = PG_HMAC_ERROR_INTERNAL; + ctx->errreason = pg_cryptohash_error(ctx->hash); if (shrinkbuf) FREE(shrinkbuf); return -1; @@ -206,7 +226,11 @@ pg_hmac_update(pg_hmac_ctx *ctx, const uint8 *data, size_t len) return -1; if (pg_cryptohash_update(ctx->hash, data, len) < 0) + { + ctx->error = PG_HMAC_ERROR_INTERNAL; + ctx->errreason = pg_cryptohash_error(ctx->hash); return -1; + } return 0; } @@ -226,11 +250,16 @@ pg_hmac_final(pg_hmac_ctx *ctx, uint8 *dest, size_t len) h = ALLOC(ctx->digest_size); if (h == NULL) + { + ctx->error = PG_HMAC_ERROR_OOM; return -1; + } memset(h, 0, ctx->digest_size); if (pg_cryptohash_final(ctx->hash, h, ctx->digest_size) < 0) { + ctx->error = PG_HMAC_ERROR_INTERNAL; + ctx->errreason = pg_cryptohash_error(ctx->hash); FREE(h); return -1; } @@ -241,6 +270,8 @@ pg_hmac_final(pg_hmac_ctx *ctx, uint8 *dest, size_t len) pg_cryptohash_update(ctx->hash, h, ctx->digest_size) < 0 || pg_cryptohash_final(ctx->hash, dest, len) < 0) { + ctx->error = PG_HMAC_ERROR_INTERNAL; + ctx->errreason = pg_cryptohash_error(ctx->hash); FREE(h); return -1; } @@ -264,3 +295,36 @@ pg_hmac_free(pg_hmac_ctx *ctx) explicit_bzero(ctx, sizeof(pg_hmac_ctx)); FREE(ctx); } + +/* + * pg_hmac_error + * + * Returns a static string providing details about an error that happened + * during a HMAC computation. + */ +const char * +pg_hmac_error(pg_hmac_ctx *ctx) +{ + if (ctx == NULL) + return _("out of memory"); + + /* + * If a reason is provided, rely on it, else fallback to any error code + * set. + */ + if (ctx->errreason) + return ctx->errreason; + + switch (ctx->error) + { + case PG_HMAC_ERROR_NONE: + return _("success"); + case PG_HMAC_ERROR_INTERNAL: + return _("internal error"); + case PG_HMAC_ERROR_OOM: + return _("out of memory"); + } + + Assert(false); /* cannot be reached */ + return _("success"); +} diff --git a/src/common/hmac_openssl.c b/src/common/hmac_openssl.c index 7efa90c99e6..44f36d51dcb 100644 --- a/src/common/hmac_openssl.c +++ b/src/common/hmac_openssl.c @@ -20,6 +20,8 @@ #include "postgres_fe.h" #endif + +#include <openssl/err.h> #include <openssl/hmac.h> #include "common/hmac.h" @@ -50,17 +52,40 @@ #define FREE(ptr) free(ptr) #endif /* FRONTEND */ +/* Set of error states */ +typedef enum pg_hmac_errno +{ + PG_HMAC_ERROR_NONE = 0, + PG_HMAC_ERROR_DEST_LEN, + PG_HMAC_ERROR_OPENSSL +} pg_hmac_errno; + /* Internal pg_hmac_ctx structure */ struct pg_hmac_ctx { HMAC_CTX *hmacctx; pg_cryptohash_type type; + pg_hmac_errno error; + const char *errreason; #ifndef FRONTEND ResourceOwner resowner; #endif }; +static const char * +SSLerrmessage(unsigned long ecode) +{ + if (ecode == 0) + return NULL; + + /* + * This may return NULL, but we would fall back to a default error path if + * that were the case. + */ + return ERR_reason_error_string(ecode); +} + /* * pg_hmac_create * @@ -78,6 +103,8 @@ pg_hmac_create(pg_cryptohash_type type) memset(ctx, 0, sizeof(pg_hmac_ctx)); ctx->type = type; + ctx->error = PG_HMAC_ERROR_NONE; + ctx->errreason = NULL; /* * Initialization takes care of assigning the correct type for OpenSSL. @@ -152,7 +179,11 @@ pg_hmac_init(pg_hmac_ctx *ctx, const uint8 *key, size_t len) /* OpenSSL internals return 1 on success, 0 on failure */ if (status <= 0) + { + ctx->errreason = SSLerrmessage(ERR_get_error()); + ctx->error = PG_HMAC_ERROR_OPENSSL; return -1; + } return 0; } @@ -174,7 +205,11 @@ pg_hmac_update(pg_hmac_ctx *ctx, const uint8 *data, size_t len) /* OpenSSL internals return 1 on success, 0 on failure */ if (status <= 0) + { + ctx->errreason = SSLerrmessage(ERR_get_error()); + ctx->error = PG_HMAC_ERROR_OPENSSL; return -1; + } return 0; } @@ -196,27 +231,45 @@ pg_hmac_final(pg_hmac_ctx *ctx, uint8 *dest, size_t len) { case PG_MD5: if (len < MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH) + { + ctx->error = PG_HMAC_ERROR_DEST_LEN; return -1; + } break; case PG_SHA1: if (len < SHA1_DIGEST_LENGTH) + { + ctx->error = PG_HMAC_ERROR_DEST_LEN; return -1; + } break; case PG_SHA224: if (len < PG_SHA224_DIGEST_LENGTH) + { + ctx->error = PG_HMAC_ERROR_DEST_LEN; return -1; + } break; case PG_SHA256: if (len < PG_SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH) + { + ctx->error = PG_HMAC_ERROR_DEST_LEN; return -1; + } break; case PG_SHA384: if (len < PG_SHA384_DIGEST_LENGTH) + { + ctx->error = PG_HMAC_ERROR_DEST_LEN; return -1; + } break; case PG_SHA512: if (len < PG_SHA512_DIGEST_LENGTH) + { + ctx->error = PG_HMAC_ERROR_DEST_LEN; return -1; + } break; } @@ -224,7 +277,11 @@ pg_hmac_final(pg_hmac_ctx *ctx, uint8 *dest, size_t len) /* OpenSSL internals return 1 on success, 0 on failure */ if (status <= 0) + { + ctx->errreason = SSLerrmessage(ERR_get_error()); + ctx->error = PG_HMAC_ERROR_OPENSSL; return -1; + } return 0; } @@ -252,3 +309,36 @@ pg_hmac_free(pg_hmac_ctx *ctx) explicit_bzero(ctx, sizeof(pg_hmac_ctx)); FREE(ctx); } + +/* + * pg_hmac_error + * + * Returns a static string providing details about an error that happened + * during a HMAC computation. + */ +const char * +pg_hmac_error(pg_hmac_ctx *ctx) +{ + if (ctx == NULL) + return _("out of memory"); + + /* + * If a reason is provided, rely on it, else fallback to any error code + * set. + */ + if (ctx->errreason) + return ctx->errreason; + + switch (ctx->error) + { + case PG_HMAC_ERROR_NONE: + return _("success"); + case PG_HMAC_ERROR_DEST_LEN: + return _("destination buffer too small"); + case PG_HMAC_ERROR_OPENSSL: + return _("OpenSSL failure"); + } + + Assert(false); /* cannot be reached */ + return _("success"); +} diff --git a/src/common/scram-common.c b/src/common/scram-common.c index 23b68b14da7..12686259299 100644 --- a/src/common/scram-common.c +++ b/src/common/scram-common.c @@ -28,12 +28,13 @@ * Calculate SaltedPassword. * * The password should already be normalized by SASLprep. Returns 0 on - * success, -1 on failure. + * success, -1 on failure with *errstr pointing to a message about the + * error details. */ int scram_SaltedPassword(const char *password, const char *salt, int saltlen, int iterations, - uint8 *result) + uint8 *result, const char **errstr) { int password_len = strlen(password); uint32 one = pg_hton32(1); @@ -44,7 +45,10 @@ scram_SaltedPassword(const char *password, pg_hmac_ctx *hmac_ctx = pg_hmac_create(PG_SHA256); if (hmac_ctx == NULL) + { + *errstr = pg_hmac_error(NULL); /* returns OOM */ return -1; + } /* * Iterate hash calculation of HMAC entry using given salt. This is @@ -58,6 +62,7 @@ scram_SaltedPassword(const char *password, pg_hmac_update(hmac_ctx, (uint8 *) &one, sizeof(uint32)) < 0 || pg_hmac_final(hmac_ctx, Ui_prev, sizeof(Ui_prev)) < 0) { + *errstr = pg_hmac_error(hmac_ctx); pg_hmac_free(hmac_ctx); return -1; } @@ -71,6 +76,7 @@ scram_SaltedPassword(const char *password, pg_hmac_update(hmac_ctx, (uint8 *) Ui_prev, SCRAM_KEY_LEN) < 0 || pg_hmac_final(hmac_ctx, Ui, sizeof(Ui)) < 0) { + *errstr = pg_hmac_error(hmac_ctx); pg_hmac_free(hmac_ctx); return -1; } @@ -87,21 +93,26 @@ scram_SaltedPassword(const char *password, /* * Calculate SHA-256 hash for a NULL-terminated string. (The NULL terminator is - * not included in the hash). Returns 0 on success, -1 on failure. + * not included in the hash). Returns 0 on success, -1 on failure with *errstr + * pointing to a message about the error details. */ int -scram_H(const uint8 *input, int len, uint8 *result) +scram_H(const uint8 *input, int len, uint8 *result, const char **errstr) { pg_cryptohash_ctx *ctx; ctx = pg_cryptohash_create(PG_SHA256); if (ctx == NULL) + { + *errstr = pg_cryptohash_error(NULL); /* returns OOM */ return -1; + } if (pg_cryptohash_init(ctx) < 0 || pg_cryptohash_update(ctx, input, len) < 0 || pg_cryptohash_final(ctx, result, SCRAM_KEY_LEN) < 0) { + *errstr = pg_cryptohash_error(ctx); pg_cryptohash_free(ctx); return -1; } @@ -111,20 +122,26 @@ scram_H(const uint8 *input, int len, uint8 *result) } /* - * Calculate ClientKey. Returns 0 on success, -1 on failure. + * Calculate ClientKey. Returns 0 on success, -1 on failure with *errstr + * pointing to a message about the error details. */ int -scram_ClientKey(const uint8 *salted_password, uint8 *result) +scram_ClientKey(const uint8 *salted_password, uint8 *result, + const char **errstr) { pg_hmac_ctx *ctx = pg_hmac_create(PG_SHA256); if (ctx == NULL) + { + *errstr = pg_hmac_error(NULL); /* returns OOM */ return -1; + } if (pg_hmac_init(ctx, salted_password, SCRAM_KEY_LEN) < 0 || pg_hmac_update(ctx, (uint8 *) "Client Key", strlen("Client Key")) < 0 || pg_hmac_final(ctx, result, SCRAM_KEY_LEN) < 0) { + *errstr = pg_hmac_error(ctx); pg_hmac_free(ctx); return -1; } @@ -134,20 +151,26 @@ scram_ClientKey(const uint8 *salted_password, uint8 *result) } /* - * Calculate ServerKey. Returns 0 on success, -1 on failure. + * Calculate ServerKey. Returns 0 on success, -1 on failure with *errstr + * pointing to a message about the error details. */ int -scram_ServerKey(const uint8 *salted_password, uint8 *result) +scram_ServerKey(const uint8 *salted_password, uint8 *result, + const char **errstr) { pg_hmac_ctx *ctx = pg_hmac_create(PG_SHA256); if (ctx == NULL) + { + *errstr = pg_hmac_error(NULL); /* returns OOM */ return -1; + } if (pg_hmac_init(ctx, salted_password, SCRAM_KEY_LEN) < 0 || pg_hmac_update(ctx, (uint8 *) "Server Key", strlen("Server Key")) < 0 || pg_hmac_final(ctx, result, SCRAM_KEY_LEN) < 0) { + *errstr = pg_hmac_error(ctx); pg_hmac_free(ctx); return -1; } @@ -164,10 +187,13 @@ scram_ServerKey(const uint8 *salted_password, uint8 *result) * * If iterations is 0, default number of iterations is used. The result is * palloc'd or malloc'd, so caller is responsible for freeing it. + * + * On error, returns NULL and sets *errstr to point to a message about the + * error details. */ char * scram_build_secret(const char *salt, int saltlen, int iterations, - const char *password) + const char *password, const char **errstr) { uint8 salted_password[SCRAM_KEY_LEN]; uint8 stored_key[SCRAM_KEY_LEN]; @@ -185,15 +211,17 @@ scram_build_secret(const char *salt, int saltlen, int iterations, /* Calculate StoredKey and ServerKey */ if (scram_SaltedPassword(password, salt, saltlen, iterations, - salted_password) < 0 || - scram_ClientKey(salted_password, stored_key) < 0 || - scram_H(stored_key, SCRAM_KEY_LEN, stored_key) < 0 || - scram_ServerKey(salted_password, server_key) < 0) + salted_password, errstr) < 0 || + scram_ClientKey(salted_password, stored_key, errstr) < 0 || + scram_H(stored_key, SCRAM_KEY_LEN, stored_key, errstr) < 0 || + scram_ServerKey(salted_password, server_key, errstr) < 0) { + /* errstr is filled already here */ #ifdef FRONTEND return NULL; #else - elog(ERROR, "could not calculate stored key and server key"); + elog(ERROR, "could not calculate stored key and server key: %s", + *errstr); #endif } @@ -215,7 +243,10 @@ scram_build_secret(const char *salt, int saltlen, int iterations, #ifdef FRONTEND result = malloc(maxlen); if (!result) + { + *errstr = _("out of memory"); return NULL; + } #else result = palloc(maxlen); #endif @@ -226,11 +257,12 @@ scram_build_secret(const char *salt, int saltlen, int iterations, encoded_result = pg_b64_encode(salt, saltlen, p, encoded_salt_len); if (encoded_result < 0) { + *errstr = _("could not encode salt"); #ifdef FRONTEND free(result); return NULL; #else - elog(ERROR, "could not encode salt"); + elog(ERROR, "%s", *errstr); #endif } p += encoded_result; @@ -241,11 +273,12 @@ scram_build_secret(const char *salt, int saltlen, int iterations, encoded_stored_len); if (encoded_result < 0) { + *errstr = _("could not encode stored key"); #ifdef FRONTEND free(result); return NULL; #else - elog(ERROR, "could not encode stored key"); + elog(ERROR, "%s", *errstr); #endif } @@ -257,11 +290,12 @@ scram_build_secret(const char *salt, int saltlen, int iterations, encoded_server_len); if (encoded_result < 0) { + *errstr = _("could not encode server key"); #ifdef FRONTEND free(result); return NULL; #else - elog(ERROR, "could not encode server key"); + elog(ERROR, "%s", *errstr); #endif } diff --git a/src/include/common/hmac.h b/src/include/common/hmac.h index cf7aa17be4f..c18783fe11f 100644 --- a/src/include/common/hmac.h +++ b/src/include/common/hmac.h @@ -25,5 +25,6 @@ extern int pg_hmac_init(pg_hmac_ctx *ctx, const uint8 *key, size_t len); extern int pg_hmac_update(pg_hmac_ctx *ctx, const uint8 *data, size_t len); extern int pg_hmac_final(pg_hmac_ctx *ctx, uint8 *dest, size_t len); extern void pg_hmac_free(pg_hmac_ctx *ctx); +extern const char *pg_hmac_error(pg_hmac_ctx *ctx); #endif /* PG_HMAC_H */ diff --git a/src/include/common/scram-common.h b/src/include/common/scram-common.h index d53b4fa7f5b..d1f840c11c7 100644 --- a/src/include/common/scram-common.h +++ b/src/include/common/scram-common.h @@ -47,12 +47,16 @@ #define SCRAM_DEFAULT_ITERATIONS 4096 extern int scram_SaltedPassword(const char *password, const char *salt, - int saltlen, int iterations, uint8 *result); -extern int scram_H(const uint8 *str, int len, uint8 *result); -extern int scram_ClientKey(const uint8 *salted_password, uint8 *result); -extern int scram_ServerKey(const uint8 *salted_password, uint8 *result); + int saltlen, int iterations, uint8 *result, + const char **errstr); +extern int scram_H(const uint8 *str, int len, uint8 *result, + const char **errstr); +extern int scram_ClientKey(const uint8 *salted_password, uint8 *result, + const char **errstr); +extern int scram_ServerKey(const uint8 *salted_password, uint8 *result, + const char **errstr); extern char *scram_build_secret(const char *salt, int saltlen, int iterations, - const char *password); + const char *password, const char **errstr); #endif /* SCRAM_COMMON_H */ diff --git a/src/interfaces/libpq/fe-auth-scram.c b/src/interfaces/libpq/fe-auth-scram.c index cc41440c4e6..e6162007041 100644 --- a/src/interfaces/libpq/fe-auth-scram.c +++ b/src/interfaces/libpq/fe-auth-scram.c @@ -80,10 +80,11 @@ static bool read_server_first_message(fe_scram_state *state, char *input); static bool read_server_final_message(fe_scram_state *state, char *input); static char *build_client_first_message(fe_scram_state *state); static char *build_client_final_message(fe_scram_state *state); -static bool verify_server_signature(fe_scram_state *state, bool *match); +static bool verify_server_signature(fe_scram_state *state, bool *match, + const char **errstr); static bool calculate_client_proof(fe_scram_state *state, const char *client_final_message_without_proof, - uint8 *result); + uint8 *result, const char **errstr); /* * Initialize SCRAM exchange status. @@ -211,6 +212,7 @@ scram_exchange(void *opaq, char *input, int inputlen, { fe_scram_state *state = (fe_scram_state *) opaq; PGconn *conn = state->conn; + const char *errstr = NULL; *done = false; *success = false; @@ -273,10 +275,10 @@ scram_exchange(void *opaq, char *input, int inputlen, * Verify server signature, to make sure we're talking to the * genuine server. */ - if (!verify_server_signature(state, success)) + if (!verify_server_signature(state, success, &errstr)) { - appendPQExpBufferStr(&conn->errorMessage, - libpq_gettext("could not verify server signature\n")); + appendPQExpBuffer(&conn->errorMessage, + libpq_gettext("could not verify server signature: %s\n"), errstr); goto error; } @@ -469,6 +471,7 @@ build_client_final_message(fe_scram_state *state) uint8 client_proof[SCRAM_KEY_LEN]; char *result; int encoded_len; + const char *errstr = NULL; initPQExpBuffer(&buf); @@ -572,11 +575,12 @@ build_client_final_message(fe_scram_state *state) /* Append proof to it, to form client-final-message. */ if (!calculate_client_proof(state, state->client_final_message_without_proof, - client_proof)) + client_proof, &errstr)) { termPQExpBuffer(&buf); - appendPQExpBufferStr(&conn->errorMessage, - libpq_gettext("could not calculate client proof\n")); + appendPQExpBuffer(&conn->errorMessage, + libpq_gettext("could not calculate client proof: %s\n"), + errstr); return NULL; } @@ -782,12 +786,13 @@ read_server_final_message(fe_scram_state *state, char *input) /* * Calculate the client proof, part of the final exchange message sent - * by the client. Returns true on success, false on failure. + * by the client. Returns true on success, false on failure with *errstr + * pointing to a message about the error details. */ static bool calculate_client_proof(fe_scram_state *state, const char *client_final_message_without_proof, - uint8 *result) + uint8 *result, const char **errstr) { uint8 StoredKey[SCRAM_KEY_LEN]; uint8 ClientKey[SCRAM_KEY_LEN]; @@ -797,17 +802,27 @@ calculate_client_proof(fe_scram_state *state, ctx = pg_hmac_create(PG_SHA256); if (ctx == NULL) + { + *errstr = pg_hmac_error(NULL); /* returns OOM */ return false; + } /* * Calculate SaltedPassword, and store it in 'state' so that we can reuse * it later in verify_server_signature. */ if (scram_SaltedPassword(state->password, state->salt, state->saltlen, - state->iterations, state->SaltedPassword) < 0 || - scram_ClientKey(state->SaltedPassword, ClientKey) < 0 || - scram_H(ClientKey, SCRAM_KEY_LEN, StoredKey) < 0 || - pg_hmac_init(ctx, StoredKey, SCRAM_KEY_LEN) < 0 || + state->iterations, state->SaltedPassword, + errstr) < 0 || + scram_ClientKey(state->SaltedPassword, ClientKey, errstr) < 0 || + scram_H(ClientKey, SCRAM_KEY_LEN, StoredKey, errstr) < 0) + { + /* errstr is already filled here */ + pg_hmac_free(ctx); + return false; + } + + if (pg_hmac_init(ctx, StoredKey, SCRAM_KEY_LEN) < 0 || pg_hmac_update(ctx, (uint8 *) state->client_first_message_bare, strlen(state->client_first_message_bare)) < 0 || @@ -821,6 +836,7 @@ calculate_client_proof(fe_scram_state *state, strlen(client_final_message_without_proof)) < 0 || pg_hmac_final(ctx, ClientSignature, sizeof(ClientSignature)) < 0) { + *errstr = pg_hmac_error(ctx); pg_hmac_free(ctx); return false; } @@ -836,10 +852,12 @@ calculate_client_proof(fe_scram_state *state, * Validate the server signature, received as part of the final exchange * message received from the server. *match tracks if the server signature * matched or not. Returns true if the server signature got verified, and - * false for a processing error. + * false for a processing error with *errstr pointing to a message about the + * error details. */ static bool -verify_server_signature(fe_scram_state *state, bool *match) +verify_server_signature(fe_scram_state *state, bool *match, + const char **errstr) { uint8 expected_ServerSignature[SCRAM_KEY_LEN]; uint8 ServerKey[SCRAM_KEY_LEN]; @@ -847,11 +865,20 @@ verify_server_signature(fe_scram_state *state, bool *match) ctx = pg_hmac_create(PG_SHA256); if (ctx == NULL) + { + *errstr = pg_hmac_error(NULL); /* returns OOM */ + return false; + } + + if (scram_ServerKey(state->SaltedPassword, ServerKey, errstr) < 0) + { + /* errstr is filled already */ + pg_hmac_free(ctx); return false; + } - if (scram_ServerKey(state->SaltedPassword, ServerKey) < 0 || /* calculate ServerSignature */ - pg_hmac_init(ctx, ServerKey, SCRAM_KEY_LEN) < 0 || + if (pg_hmac_init(ctx, ServerKey, SCRAM_KEY_LEN) < 0 || pg_hmac_update(ctx, (uint8 *) state->client_first_message_bare, strlen(state->client_first_message_bare)) < 0 || @@ -866,6 +893,7 @@ verify_server_signature(fe_scram_state *state, bool *match) pg_hmac_final(ctx, expected_ServerSignature, sizeof(expected_ServerSignature)) < 0) { + *errstr = pg_hmac_error(ctx); pg_hmac_free(ctx); return false; } @@ -883,9 +911,12 @@ verify_server_signature(fe_scram_state *state, bool *match) /* * Build a new SCRAM secret. + * + * On error, returns NULL and sets *errstr to point to a message about the + * error details. */ char * -pg_fe_scram_build_secret(const char *password) +pg_fe_scram_build_secret(const char *password, const char **errstr) { char *prep_password; pg_saslprep_rc rc; @@ -899,20 +930,25 @@ pg_fe_scram_build_secret(const char *password) */ rc = pg_saslprep(password, &prep_password); if (rc == SASLPREP_OOM) + { + *errstr = _("out of memory"); return NULL; + } if (rc == SASLPREP_SUCCESS) password = (const char *) prep_password; /* Generate a random salt */ if (!pg_strong_random(saltbuf, SCRAM_DEFAULT_SALT_LEN)) { + *errstr = _("failed to generate random salt"); if (prep_password) free(prep_password); return NULL; } result = scram_build_secret(saltbuf, SCRAM_DEFAULT_SALT_LEN, - SCRAM_DEFAULT_ITERATIONS, password); + SCRAM_DEFAULT_ITERATIONS, password, + errstr); if (prep_password) free(prep_password); diff --git a/src/interfaces/libpq/fe-auth.c b/src/interfaces/libpq/fe-auth.c index 2edc3f48e2e..f8f4111fef7 100644 --- a/src/interfaces/libpq/fe-auth.c +++ b/src/interfaces/libpq/fe-auth.c @@ -1293,11 +1293,13 @@ PQencryptPasswordConn(PGconn *conn, const char *passwd, const char *user, */ if (strcmp(algorithm, "scram-sha-256") == 0) { - crypt_pwd = pg_fe_scram_build_secret(passwd); - /* We assume the only possible failure is OOM */ + const char *errstr = NULL; + + crypt_pwd = pg_fe_scram_build_secret(passwd, &errstr); if (!crypt_pwd) - appendPQExpBufferStr(&conn->errorMessage, - libpq_gettext("out of memory\n")); + appendPQExpBuffer(&conn->errorMessage, + libpq_gettext("could not encrypt password: %s\n"), + errstr); } else if (strcmp(algorithm, "md5") == 0) { diff --git a/src/interfaces/libpq/fe-auth.h b/src/interfaces/libpq/fe-auth.h index f22b3fe6488..049a8bb1a10 100644 --- a/src/interfaces/libpq/fe-auth.h +++ b/src/interfaces/libpq/fe-auth.h @@ -25,6 +25,7 @@ extern char *pg_fe_getauthname(PQExpBuffer errorMessage); /* Mechanisms in fe-auth-scram.c */ extern const pg_fe_sasl_mech pg_scram_mech; -extern char *pg_fe_scram_build_secret(const char *password); +extern char *pg_fe_scram_build_secret(const char *password, + const char **errstr); #endif /* FE_AUTH_H */ diff --git a/src/tools/pgindent/typedefs.list b/src/tools/pgindent/typedefs.list index 5015fa7db00..89249ecc97c 100644 --- a/src/tools/pgindent/typedefs.list +++ b/src/tools/pgindent/typedefs.list @@ -3361,6 +3361,7 @@ pg_fe_sasl_mech pg_funcptr_t pg_gssinfo pg_hmac_ctx +pg_hmac_errno pg_int64 pg_local_to_utf_combined pg_locale_t |